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Abstract:  This is an historic overview of conservation in Sub-Saharan Africa from   
pre-colonial times through the present. It demonstrates that Africans practiced conservation 
that was ignored by the colonial powers. The colonial market economy combined with the 
human and livestock population explosion of the 21
st century are the major factors 
contributing to the demise of wildlife and critical habitat. Unique insight is provided into 
the economics of a representative safari company, something that has not been readily 
available to Community Based Natural Resources Management (CBNRM) practitioners. 
Modern attempts at sharing benefits from conservation with rural communities will fail due 
to the low rural resource to population ratio regardless of the model, combined with the 
uneven distribution of profits from safari hunting that drives most CBNRM programs, 
unless these ratios are changed. Low household incomes from CBNRM are unlikely to 
change attitudes of rural dwellers towards Western approaches to conservation. 
Communities must sustainably manage their natural areas as “green factories” for the 
multitude of natural resources they contain as a means of maximizing employment and 
thus household incomes, as well as meeting the often overlooked socio-cultural ties to 
wildlife and other natural resources, which may be as important as direct material benefits 
in assuring conservation of wildlife and its habitat. For CBNRM to be successful in the 
long-term, full devolution of ownership over land and natural resources must take place. In 
addition, as a means of relieving pressure on the rural resource base, this will require an 
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urbanization process that creates a middleclass, as opposed to the current slums that form 
the majority of Africa’s cities, through industrialization that transforms the unique natural 
resources of the subcontinent (e.g., strategic minerals, petroleum, wildlife, hardwoods, 
fisheries, wild medicines, agricultural products, etc.) in Africa.  
Keywords: wildlife; conservation; development; CBNRM; population; industrialization 
 
1. Summary  
Pre-colonial Africa had extensive management systems in place linked to social controls as opposed 
to purely ecological objectives. European colonizers not only failed to recognize these management 
systems and their role in maintaining a balance with nature, but with the improved technology of 
modern firearms along with a capitalist model of exploitation they were the primary cause for the 
initial demise of wildlife. The approximate 6-fold increase in Sub-Saharan Africa’s human populations 
in the 21
st century hastened the decline of both wildlife and critical habitat. Attempts at separating 
Africans from their natural systems through creation of parks and protected areas that accelerated at 
the end of the colonial era, often comprising incomplete ecosystems, have and will fall short of 
conserving biodiversity. They alienate rural Africans, compressing them into areas that fail to sustain 
them, resulting in soil degradation, poaching of resources and eventual encroachment into these natural 
protected areas. The dynamic concept of Community Based Natural Resource Management 
(CBNRM), which developed in Southern Africa in the 1980’s as a means of co-opting rural 
communities into the conservation process by sharing revenue primarily from safari hunting, provides 
insignificant benefits at the household level, fails to integrate rural Africans and their socio-cultural 
needs into the management of the protected area, and retains dependency upon a middleman who 
captures most of the net profits. Governments retain ownership over wildlife and obtain revenue 
directly from its harvest, being both players and referees. The authors propose African solutions to 
conservation through development of a multiple-resource use model that increases benefits to 
individual households and meets their social needs. However, regardless of how it is structured, due to 
low resource/population ratios in rural Sub-Saharan Africa, CBNRM on its own fails unless it fits into 
a larger plan for development of urbanization and industrialization through transformation of natural 
resources in Africa that takes pressure off these rural areas. 
2. Historical Background  
2.1. Co-Evolution of Man and Wildlife in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The persistence of mega fauna in Africa as opposed to other continents is partly ascribed to   
co-evolution with proto- and modern humans. The co-evolution of humans and mega-fauna over 
millions of years provided wildlife “time to learn a healthy fear of man and with it a healthy avoidance 
of hunters” [1-9]. Unlike other continents, Africa’s mega fauna were spared over-exploitation by 
humans until the relatively recent arrival of the European colonizers about 350 years ago. 
“Conservation” can be defined as a socio-economic process by which societies endeavour to manage Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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resource scarcities and limit off take within the biological capacity of the systems in order to sustain 
production [10]. While not employing modern Western designed concepts such as measuring carrying 
capacity, maximum sustained yields, wildlife counting and indices as a means of setting harvest 
quotas, etc., pre-colonial Africans nonetheless used a number of management interventions. Access to 
natural resources, including agricultural land, pasture, wildlife, tree products and fish, was controlled 
by a very strict social hierarchy through extended families and clans, often under the authority of 
chiefs/headmen/elders [11-15], religious leaders/spirit mediums or hunting guilds [14-21]; borrowed 
from the ancestors [13] as “Common Property Resources” for the good of the greater community. In 
addition, taboos/totems [13,14,17,22-24], royal game [11,13,25,26], territoriality [17,19,21,27-35], 
mobility/migration [30,34,36,37], habitat manipulation (e.g., fire, fallow) [38,39], harvest regulations 
(e.g., no harvesting of pregnant females or young) and seasons [19,21], resulted in biological and 
sociological controls over the access to wildlife and other resources. Rules and regulations regarding 
access to natural resources were precise and codified, although not written down, and had been 
enforced since time immemorial. The result was sustainable exploitation of natural resources. This had 
been accomplished with no ecological purpose (e.g., maintenance of biodiversity) in mind, as we 
understand it, but out of a sheer instinct for self-preservation. Conservation of game animals and fish 
was necessary in order to provide for survival in the future [40].  
2.2. Colonialism and Post-Colonial Conservation and Its Impact on Traditional Management Systems 
Wildlife became a point of contact between African people’s traditional values and European ideas 
of ownership. European colonists introduced both a strong market economy and firearms that tipped 
the scales towards over-exploitation [41]. Colonialism expropriated the landscape and alienated 
Africans from it [42]. Colonialism excluded African beliefs in the intrinsic power and value of nature 
in favour of Western Judeo-Christian tenets of taming and civilizing nature [41]. As in North America, 
it suited colonial incomers to overlook signs of native alteration of the landscape; the apparent absence 
of indigenous improvements, helping to justify the removal of indigenous people from tribal lands to 
make way for the more sophisticated European settler [40].  
For instance, there is strong evidence that the pre-colonial East Africa of the 19
th century was not 
the wildlife paradise that it is today. Many of Tanzania’s well-known game reserves and parks of the 
20
th/21
st centuries, including the Selous, Ngorongoro Crater, Serengeti, Lake Manyara National Park, 
and Lake Rukwa Game Reserve, had more people and livestock than wildlife as man dominated both 
wildlife and habitat through hunting, as well as bush clearing by fire, axe and grazing by livestock 
[39]. However, by the time the Europeans arrived in East Africa in the 1890s, this life had changed, 
mainly due to human, livestock and wildlife diseases inadvertently introduced by the colonizers, 
helping to solidify the latter’s prejudices concerning the backwardness of the “natives” and resulted in 
East Africa’s loss of control over nature and the eventual spread of bush. This included rinderpest, 
smallpox, sand flea, locusts, the Maji Maji Rebellion of 1905 against colonialism 
i, food procurement 
for military purposes by Europeans linked to WWI, colonial warfare with the Germans in WWI, forced 
labour by the Germans/Europeans, famine associated with the above, eventually European imposed 
wildlife reserves, and eventually villages concentrated as part of tsetse fly control imposed by 
Europeans. By 1937, 66% of Tanzania, and thus prime wildlife habitat, was occupied by tsetse fly 
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compared to 33% in 1913 [39]. The combination of these events resulted in the de-development and 
impoverishment of rural Tanzanians. It is estimated that 750,000 people died of hunger between 1894 
and 1899. Also, it is estimated that human populations in the East Africa/Great Lakes region did not 
return to pre-1890s levels until the 1950s [40]. At a crucial stage in the retreat of man and cattle from 
the advancement of nature, a new ecological balance was established in which “nature” and “not man” 
was in control [39,43].  
What had been a peaceful relationship between herders and agriculturists, in which trade was 
implicit and mutually beneficial, broke down, as starving pastoralists began raiding to survive [39]. 
Kjekshus [39] believes that the intense tribal raiding the Germans experienced upon their arrival in 
Tanganyika (today’s Tanzania) was the direct consequence of economic losses suffered initially 
through rinderpest. Similar events also occurred in Kenya and Uganda resulting in comparable 
disruptions in the society and ecology [40]. It is estimated that 95% of all cattle died in East Africa, 
resulting in one of the “twin pillars” of the traditional economy—the lifeline of the people—being torn 
away. Rinderpest was a subduing force aiding the colonial takeover, by taking the fight out of the war-
like Maasai. While Maasai morani (warriors) survived through hunting and petty thieving, the majority 
of the Maasai lived as beggars among neighbouring peasants. While agricultural societies could avoid 
starvation with their crops, the nomadic pastoralists were starving to death [39]. 
The European colonizer brought order to perceived anarchy and chaos, disrupting traditional 
management systems in the process. Western systems of governance were imposed on other cultures, 
ultimately taking away the self-respect and dignity of once proud people through the creation of 
second class citizenry subservient to European settlers, a stigma that to this day may still be holding 
back Africa from the envisioned renaissance [40]. 
As in North America, wildlife became a resource of European conquest [43], providing income 
(e.g., ivory and skins) [43,44], and a cheap source of meat for “penetrating the country by feeding the 
natives” [43]. Wildlife stood in the way of “Civilization and Christianity”, competing for space and 
pasture with livestock, its eradication along with the associated tsetse fly being a prerequisite to 
European imperialism. Books by mostly English and Scottish explorers, ivory hunters and adventure 
seekers, many ex-military officers and royalty promoted the myth of a wild, untamed Africa, a savage 
land, adventure, manliness, nobility and courage. This served as a magnet to draw the hopeless 
European masses to this land of plenty, where with only a gun and oxcart one could get rich quickly or 
find wide open spaces on which to settle, a luxury in an over-populated and class-conscious Europe. A 
similar cry in the 1800s, “Go West Young Man, Go West”, encouraged European immigrants to 
America to seek their fortunes, pushing aside the Amerindians and slaughtering the wildlife (e.g., 
bison and beaver) for meat and money, with ox-cart and musket/long-rifle in seeking their fortunes. In 
both cases, some became rich, and many died along the way from resisting indigenes, disease and 
thirst. 
In Southern Africa, this attitude towards wildlife resulted in the asset stripping of game, being 
worked out like a mineral seam [43]. In 1652, van Riebeeck reported that a French ship in Saldanha 
Bay had harvested 48,000 seals for their skins and oil over a six month period from around Dassen 
Island. By 1656, it took the Dutch East India Company three years to harvest 48,000 seals that the 
French had taken in six months [45]. The Africans, and Boer Afrikaner settlers of Dutch, German and 
French Huguenot descent, who often collaborated in market-hunting, saw wildlife much differently Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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than the “sporting” English gentlemen that were to follow in their footsteps. Boer hunting parties 
usually consisted of numerous armed zwarteskutters (black marksmen) or jagtkaffers (hunting kaffirs), 
in an equitable partnership. Wildlife had a utilitarian value for trade and food, which allowed them to 
assert their independence as they moved into the interior to escape the ever-increasing authority of the 
British in the Cape [41]. It is estimated in the 1700s that there were 500,000,000 springbok between 
the southernmost limits of the Karoo and the Kalahari Desert of South Africa and Namibia [46]. One 
million antelope skins were being exported annually in the 1870s from the Orange Free State [43]. By 
1896, these great springbok migrations had nearly come to an end, victims of guns, clubs, advancing 
civilization, and the cows and sheep that devoured their pasture [46]. In South Africa, the bluebuck 
(Hippotragus leucophaeus) was extinct by 1800, the Cape warthog, Phacochoerus aethiopicus 
aethiopicus, by 1860 and the quagga (Equus quagga) by 1870. South Africa had an estimated   
100,000 elephants (Loxodonta africana) in the 1650s [46]. In the Old Transvaal, 90,000 kg of ivory 
was exported in 1855 along with vast quantities of hide and horn [41]. By the turn of the century, the 
elephant, white rhino, Cape mountain zebra, bontebok and black wildebeest were on the verge of 
extinction in Southern Africa [40,44] (Table 1). 
Table 1. Dates and estimated numbers on the near extinction of key mega-fauna in 
Southern Africa. Source: [40].  
SPECIES DATE  ESTIMATE 
African Elephant (Loxodonta africana) 
 
  South Africa  
  Zimbabwe 
  Namibia 
 
 
1920s 
1900 
1900 
 
 
120 
< 4,000 
300 
White Rhino (Ceratotherium simum) 1895  20 
Cape Mountain Zebra ( Equus zebra zebra )   1922   400 
Bontebok ( Damaliscus dorcas dorcas) 1927  120 
Black Wildebeest ( Connochaetes gnou) 1890    550 
 
The situation in West and East Africa was not much different with these regions being stripped of 
their wildlife resources (Table 2). It is estimated that between 1608 and 1612, 23,000 kg/year of ivory 
was imported to Holland alone, mostly from West Africa [47]. In 1909, just one forest concessionaire, 
the N’Goko-Sangha Company from the Sangha Basin of French Equatorial Africa, exported 6,625 kg 
of ivory. When another company, CFSO (Compagnie Forestière de la Sangha-Oubangui) took over 
this concession, its annual exports fluctuated between 2,694 kg in 1911 to 4,105 kg of ivory in   
1917 [48]. Between 1937 and 1939, 200,000 elephants were killed in the Belgian Congo (today’s 
Democratic Republic of Congo) for ivory [47]. It is estimated that 2 million duikers were being killed 
annually for their hides in Francophone Africa south of the Sahara during the 1950s [44].  
In Tanzania, from 1903-1911, a total of 256,000 kg of ivory was exported, representing 
approximately 1,200 to 1,500 elephants killed/year with the likelihood that significant amounts of 
ivory were smuggled out on dhows 
iii in order to avoid the 15% export tax of the Kaiser. During this 
same period (1902-1911), 53,000 kg of rhino horn was exported, representing 2,000 to 2,300 rhino’s Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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shot/year, while 1,000 live animals, 50,000 kg of antelope horns and 2,700 kg of valuable bird feathers 
were exported to Germany [49]. In Somaliland (Somalia) alone 350,000 dik-dik skins/year (Madoqua 
sp.  and Rhynchotragus sp.) and about 70,000 wildlife skins/year were exported, 80% of which   
were giraffe (Giraffa camelopardalis reticulata), gazelles (Gazella spp.) and gerenuk (Litocranius 
walleri) [50].  
 
Table 2. Confirmed examples of typical wildlife products exported from colonial West and 
East Africa. 
 
WILDLIFE 
RESOURCE 
DATE SOURCE  QUANTITY 
EXPORTED  
 
DESTINATION SOURCE 
Ivory  1608–1612  Mostly West Africa  23,000 kg/yr  Holland  [47] 
Ivory  1909–1917  Sangha Basin, French 
Equatorial Africa 
2,694–6,625 kg/yr  France/Europe  [48] 
Ivory 1903–1911  Tanzania  28,444  kg/yr 
representing 1,200–1,500 
elephants/yr 
Germany/Europe [49] 
Rhino Horn  1903–1911  Tanzania  5,889 kg/yr 
representing 2,000–2,300 
rhino/yr
Germany/Europe [49] 
Duiker Skins  1950  Sub-Saharan 
Francophone Africa 
2 million/yr  France/Europe  [44] 
Dik-dik Skins 
(Madoqua sp. & 
Rhynchotragus sp.) 
Mid-20
th 
Century 
Somaliland 350,000/yr  Europe  [50] 
 
2.3. The Coming of Game Laws, Parks and Reserves 
The perception of the colonial masters was that Africans and their poaching activities were the 
reason for declining wildlife numbers [41,43,51]. Even though Africans had co-evolved with wildlife, 
the colonial powers failed to recognize that it was the coming of the European, with superior 
technology, the “modern firearm,” and the commercialization of wildlife in a way that Africa had 
never seen (Figure 1), along with the westerners desire to have dominion over nature (e.g., fencing the 
land, conversion of natural systems into cultivated land and competition with livestock for pasture) 
that brought a number of species to extinction or near extinction. This was eventually compounded by 
the human and corresponding livestock population explosions on the subcontinent in the 20
th century. 
Human populations exploded during the 20
th century because of improved parasite control and medical 
care. This placed much of rural Sub-Saharan Africa out of balance with nature on marginal savannah 
soils that compose 70-75% of the subcontinent, and associated resources (e.g., wildlife) [40]. Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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Figure 1. Introduction of modern firearms and commercialization of wildlife helped bring 
a number of wildlife species to near extinction. Source: Principal author, Turkana, northern 
Kenya, with traditional long bow and British Enfield, 1992. 
 
 
Once the scramble for Africa was over and the continent had been carved up, it belonged to 
everyone but native Africans. The culture of hunting in Europe was turned into part of the culture of 
European Imperialism in Africa [41]. European imperialism also excluded Africans and their 
traditional hunting methods as “un-sporting,” and “not fair chase”, failing to recognize that Africans 
had always conserved wildlife and habitat as part of their cultural heritage and survival network. The 
Game Law Amendment of 1891 and the Game Preservation Ordinance Act of 1899 brought about the 
end of frontier exploitation by adventurers like ivory hunters in Southern Africa. Though passed in the 
Cape of Good Hope (a British colony), the game legislation was imposed on the British South African 
Company (BSAC) in its charter by the imperial state. Thus the game laws would be applied to the 
(BSACs) territory, later (in 1923) to become Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland 
(modern day Zambia, Zimbabwe and Malawi, respectively) [15,52-57]. The colonial masters of 
England, France, Belgium, Portugal and Spain signed the first international conservation treaty in 
1900, “The Convention for the Preservation of Animals, Birds and Fish in Africa”. The goal of this 
treaty was to save African wildlife for hunting by royalty and upper class Europeans, and for ivory 
[58]. Africans had their traditional governance and resource management systems usurped by Western 
laws [15,52-57]. In 1933, an International Conference for the Protection of Flora and Fauna of Africa, 
held in London, laid down the principles on which national parks were to be established. Human 
populations were moved off of and denied access to their traditional hunting grounds, burial sites, 
sacred forests, etc. Traditional hunters and resource exploiters were turned into poachers (Figure 2) 
and alienated from these imposed management systems. Policies such as regroupement that 
concentrated Africans along major roads where they could be more easily administered [27,48] 
resulted in modified forest and savannah ecology, and soil degradation from decreased fallow. 
Exclusion from accessing parks and protected areas saw bush encroachment and declining biodiversity 
in many savannah areas, a failing by Western conservationists to understand the anthropogenic role Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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man played in the evolution of African savannah and forest ecology [40]. Parks and game reserves 
were “white inventions, which elevated wildlife above humanity, which served as instruments of 
dispossession and subjugation” in which Africans were non-partners who were neither able to continue 
their traditional subsistence lifestyles in conserved areas, nor were fully co-opted into the system of 
Western conservation imposed on them [41,59].  
Figure 2. Creation of parks and protected areas turned traditional hunters into poachers. 
Source: Principal author, Baka Pygmies, southeastern Cameroon, 2001. 
 
At the same time in Southern Africa and to a lesser degree in East Africa (especially Kenya), 
indigenous people were forced off their land to make way for European settlers. A major issue facing 
land reform in Southern Africa is the significant difference in how black and white Africans relate to 
the land. Traditionally for the black African land belonged/s to the ancestors and through the lineage 
group was allocated by the village head/chief to a head of household. It was returned to the lineage 
group for redistribution when the household stopped farming the plot of land and/or the head of the 
household died. No individual could own a piece of land. For the white settler/African, based upon 
his/her European ancestry, land was/is owned with a title deed, demarcated and fenced by an 
individual; a commodity which could be bought and sold. The black African related to land as 
something sacred tied to his/her ancestors, whereas the white African related to the landscape—nature, 
the wildlife and the products that he/she could obtain from the land, but which the black African felt 
must be returned to his/her ancestors [47]. The liberation war of Zimbabwe or “Chimurenga” was 
fought over rectifying the brutal injustices with regards to land and the liberation fighters were known 
as Vana Vevhu or “children of the soil”. One could argue that this “war” is still being played out at the 
beginning of the 21
st century, especially in Kenya, Zimbabwe, Namibia and South Africa [40]. 
2.4. Parks and Protected Areas in the 20
th & 21
st Century 
In 1990, the World Parks Commission set a goal of protecting 10% of the planet's surface. In  
Sub-Saharan Africa, over a million km
2 of land has been set aside as national parks and game reserves, 
yet they have been remarkably unsuccessful at protecting wildlife [60]. This can only happen at the 
expense of displacing and compressing rural Africans into smaller and smaller areas, along with 
increased impoverishment and habitat degradation in the compressed areas [60]. The International 
Union for the Conservation of Nature’s (IUCN)
iv classification of protected areas covers 6 categories Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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ranging from extreme protection (Categories Ia–III) with Category II a national park, to 
conservation/management interventions in (Categories IV–VI) with Category VI allowing a 
“sustainable flow of natural products and services to meet community needs [61]. Unfortunately in 
Africa, there are few protected areas under Category VI. In Africa alone, it is estimated that there have 
been from 14 million [62] to as many as 39.5 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) from creation 
of parks and protected areas, the latter figure extrapolated by using 1997 IUCN protected area data and 
25 persons/km
2 [63]. The majority of this displacement has occurred within the last 30 years   
(1970–2000) [63] and continues.  
Much of this has taken place as a result of collusion between Western NGOs (non-governmental 
organizations), Western donors and African governments. For instance, Conservation International 
(CI), The Nature Conservancy (TNC), the World Wildlife Fund (WWF), and the Wildlife 
Conservation Society (WCS) among the five largest conservation organizations (or BINGOS/Big 
conservation NGOs) absorbed over 70% of the US$ 300 million put into international conservation by 
USAID (United States Agency for International Development) in the 1990s [62]. 
Given today’s level of poverty and human population growth, one of the actions that may be 
necessary in the 21
st century is the reclassification of most protected areas to Category VI, since 
protected areas classified under other categories are being rapidly encroached upon and/or poached out 
by alienated communities opting out for other land uses as a survival mechanism. Many African 
countries appear to have gone overboard in achieving this 10% goal (Figure 3) [64].  
Figure 3. Percentage protected area of total territorial area (terrestrial and marine) of 
representative Sub-Saharan countries, 2008. Source: [64]. 
 
 
Kjekshus [39] provides an excellent historical overview for the removal of indigenous people in 
East Africa beginning in the 1890s and accelerating near independence, including: 
 
  The forced removal of 500 people from the Gombe Stream Chimpanzee Sanctuary, just north 
of Kigoma on the shores of Lake Tanganyika. Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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  The Mbulu Game Reserve, Tanganyika, containing 10,000 people, their settlements and 1,000s 
of acres of grazing land. 
  The Katawi and Sabi River Game Reserves, Tanganyika where the removal of people was 
required. 
  The Serengeti Game Reserve, in which the Maasai lost 83% of their former land area. 
  The Selous Game Reserve (SGR) from which 40,000 people were moved.  
  The Budonga Game Reserve by Lake Albert, Uganda, from which people were eventually 
removed to protect them from tsetse fly and to encourage the proliferation of wildlife over the 
12,950 km
2 (5,000 mi
2) reserve [43]. 
 
Eventually, the Maasai would be pushed off more land including Ngorongoro Crater in the 1950s. 
Between the late 1940s and 1970, seven protected areas were created in Maasai areas, further 
restricting the Maasai people’s range: Nairobi, Amboseli, Tsavo National Parks and the Maasai Mara 
in Kenya, and Serengeti, Tarangire and Lake Manyara National Parks in Tanzania. Many of these 
parks/reserves have been managed as isolated islands of game protected from people like the Maasai. 
The compression of Maasai into smaller and smaller areas bordering these parks has resulted in over-
grazing and habitat degradation. However, this wildlife is not contained entirely within these reserves. 
In fact, it is believed that in Kenya, 80% of the wildlife is found or dependent on 80% of the critical 
wildlife habitat outside parks and reserves. The areas outside the parks/reserves serve as rainy season 
dispersal areas where young are born, as well as giving habitat within these protected areas an 
opportunity to recover from grazing/browsing [40]. Carruthers [41] provides an excellent history of 
Kruger National Park, South Africa and the eventual forced removal of its residents on a large scale by 
the 1950s [40]. 
In the early 1990s, Ogwang and DeGeorges [69] documented the use of USAID money in 
collaboration with Uganda’s national parks service (today’s Uganda Wildlife Authority/UWA) and 
various NGOs to evict and/or prevent residents from accessing critical natural resources necessary for 
their livelihood to create Bwindi, “The Impenetrable Forest” (first WWF and then WCS) to protect 300 
IUCN “Critically Endangered” mountain gorillas (Gorilla gorilla beringei), and Lake Mburo National 
Parks, as well as attempts to move people out of the Rwenzori National Park (WCS). Hulme [70] 
provides a more up-to-date analysis on Lake Mburo where as many as 80,000 cattle are estimated to 
graze during the dry season, many of them illegal. Colchester [60] gives a number of examples, citing 
that of the Kibale Game Corridor, linking Kibale Forest to Queen Elizabeth National Park, Uganda, 
where 30,000 people were removed against their will. In many instances, these parks have enclave 
communities such as fishermen in Lake Mburo and Queen Elizabeth National Parks and/or allow 
access to some resources such as minor forest products, but not economically important timber as in 
Bwindi. There is some revenue sharing with communities, though minor at the household level [40]. 
This disenfranchisement continues into the 21
st century. In many parts of Africa, including 
Botswana, South Africa, Tanzania and Gabon, the majority, by area, of strictly protected areas have 
evictions reported [65-67].  
Igoe and Croucher [68] demonstrate how communities around Tarangire National Park (TNP) have 
been coerced by African Wildlife Foundation (AWF),  “officially designated by the Tanzanian 
government to oversee the establishment of WMAs in northeastern Tanzania” and the Wildlife Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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Division into forming Burunge WMA, located on the northwestern side of the park. This has resulted 
in the eviction of people from the WMA, and mainly brought benefits to safari operators, the Wildlife 
Division and a few village elites, while meeting the agenda of AWF for fundraising and to form 
wildlife corridors connecting the major parks of Maasailand.  
Magome, Grossman, Fakir and Stowell [71] provide an excellent historical perspective on how the 
47,000 ha Madikwe Park, South Africa went from white-owned to black-owned cattle ranches and 
then into a park. Lack of land tenure rights by the Madikwe community is a major weakness in their 
being able to bargain for an appropriate share of the benefits from this venture. In fact, the state has 
taken ownership. 
The Central Kalahari has been occupied for hundreds of thousands of years by hunters and 
gatherers (e.g., G/ui, G//ana, and some Kua San), and since the early part of the first millennium AD 
by agro-pastoral populations (e.g., Bakgalagadi). The Central Kalahari Game Reserve (CKGR) was 
established in 1961, prior to independence (1966) to protect resident human populations (including 
San and Bakgalagadi), wildlife and the unique ecological landscape. Hitchcock [29] goes into some 
detail over the forced removal of San (Basarwa) from the CKGR in 1997, 2001 and 2002 to the 
resettlement villages of New! Xade and Caudate. Attempts in 2002 to take the matter of residential 
rights in the CKGR to court were dismissed on a technicality. The case was successfully appealed [72] 
and in a landmark decision, Botswana's High Court ruled on December 13, 2006 that the so-called 
Bushmen of the Kalahari were illegally evicted from their ancestral land and should be allowed to 
return. However, according to Survival International [73], the government has done everything it can 
to make their return impossible. It has: 
 
  Banned them from using their water boreholes, 
  Refused to issue a single permit to hunt on their land, 
  Arrested more than 50 Bushmen for hunting to feed their families, 
  Banned them from taking their small herds of goats back to the reserve.  
 
Its policy is to intimidate and frighten the Bushmen into staying in resettlement camps, and making 
the life impossible for those who have gone back to their ancestral land. 
Over the last 10 years, the Baka Pygmies and others of south-eastern Cameroon have lost legal 
access to 70% of their forests through the creation of parks and hunting blocks with Western funding 
from the Global Environment Facility (GEF) managed jointly by the World Bank, UNDP (United 
Nations Development Program) and UNEP (United Nations Environmental Program) and paid for by 
industrialized countries channelled through Western NGOs and sanctioned by the Cameroonian 
government. These same processes continue across the borders in Congo Brazzaville and the Central 
African Republic linked through the transnational Lobeké/Dzanga-Sangha/Nouabalé-Ndoki “Tri-
National De La Sangha” National Park [40].  
Sadly, to date, few if any human rights NGO’s have held the conservation NGO’s, Western donors 
or African governments/leaders accountable for what they are doing to indigenous peoples in the name 
of conservation; resulting in environmental degradation, impoverishment, malnourishment and cultural 
genocide. It would seem that words like “biodiversity”, “conservation” and “endemism”, are part of 
some holy grail that is there for the good of mankind and not to be questioned. These groups appear Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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accountable to no one in terms of consequences to people. The Cameroon goal is to have 30% of its 
territory in protected areas under pressure from the World Bank [40]. South Africa, with 6.06% of its 
land in protected areas in 2008, would have to designate about 50,935 km
2 (an area slightly smaller 
than the total territorial area [terrestrial and marine] of Holland, 1.6 times that of Belgium and 12% of 
France) to attain its 10% goal of land under conservation. However, if one adds in the 1999 estimate of 
17 million ha in private game ranches [40], though not considered part of the formal protected area 
network, they are 2.2 times South Africa’s protected area network and over 3 times the amount of land 
needed to achieve 10%.  
The Western world seems to have forgotten that there were people using these natural areas before 
they were declared parks, game and forest reserves. By compressing people onto land that can no 
longer support them (e.g., similar to homelands in South Africa, communal lands in Zimbabwe and 
tribal lands in Kenya), the Western conservation world is forcing rural Africans 1) to degrade their 
environment, 2) opt for other land uses (e.g., agriculture and livestock), 3) poach as a means of 
survival and protest [41,74] and 4) flock to the cities in search of a better life, which usually is 
nonexistent. For many, this is resulting in “politics of despair,”
v returning to the rural areas to illegally 
access and eventually mine what have become “open access”
vi resources in protected areas which are 
no longer being managed, but defended against people who have been alienated from Western 
philosophies of conservation. This is resulting in the loss of habitat and biodiversity [40]. Is this any 
different from what happened during the colonial era to the Indians in North America or Sub-Saharan 
Africa where indigenous people were displaced, to make way for European farmers, onto reservations, 
homelands or communal areas that could neither ecologically nor economically support them? Only 
today, people are being displaced in the name of the elephant, gorilla and “biodiversity”, with the same 
dire economic and social consequences, and impoverishment; agendas pushed by Western NGOs and 
supported by their donors and African political elite. This is what might be called “Global Apartheid” 
in which large tracts of Sub-Saharan Africa are being set aside for a “Global Elite,” consisting of 
transnational eco-tourists, safari hunters, the private companies who serve these clients, governments, 
Western NGOs and their researchers. Is this sustainable?  
3. CBNRM, an Attempt to Mitigate the Past 
3.1. Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) 
 
Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) is a concept made popular in the  
mid-to-late 1970s beginning with Zimbabwe’s development of the Communal Areas Management 
Program for Indigenous Resources (CAMPFIRE), with significant review in the literature [74-83]. It 
was eventually funded by USAID. Because of its perceived success and for political reasons [40], 
similar programs developed in other East and Southern African countries that have also been 
extensively reviewed in the literature, much of this information being readily available online for those 
readers wishing to delve deeper into a particular country’s CBNRM program: 
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  ADMADE–Zambia, “Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas” 
funded by USAID through the Wildlife Conservation Society (WCS) of the New York 
Zoological Society [84-94]; 
  NRMP–Botswana, “Natural Resources Management Program”, also called Botswana 
Community Trust Program funded by USAID through a U.S. consulting firm,   
CHEMONICS [95-97] 
  LIFE–Namibia, “Living in a Finite Environment” run through World Wildlife Fund 
(WWF)/USA and funded by USAID [97-104]; 
  SCP–Tanzania, “Selous Conservation Program (SCP)” funded by the German funding agency- 
GTZ [105-113]; 
  LIRDP–Zambia, “Luangwa Integrated Resource Development Project” funded by the 
Norwegian Agency for International Development (NORAD) [113,114] 
 
Traditionally, CBNRM was initiated in areas outside the park estate, co-habited by humans and 
wildlife bordering parks or in game reserves that were designated as hunting blocks [115]. CBNRM 
appears in many guises, including Integrated Conservation and Development (ICD), Community-
Based Conservation (CBC), Community-Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM), 
Community Wildlife Management (CWM), Collaborative (or Co-) Management (CM) and Protected 
Area Outreach Projects [116].  
Since administration and control through repression by centralized governments was not saving 
wildlife, the idea arose of sharing wealth from the sustainable use of resources with rural people. 
Donors recognized that African states were unable to centrally manage natural resources and with the 
re-emergence of democratic aspirations, Western donors began pushing for the devolution of resource 
rights to peripheral communities living in and around the parks and protected areas. Donors brought 
along their own baggage including decentralization, gender, transparency, democratization [89] and 
often compliance with IMF/World Bank structural adjustment policies (SAPs)
vii as a prerequisite for 
donor support. Thus, while the stimulus, staffing and concepts did not come from the rural 
communities, nor were the resources expended directly on these communities, they were expected to 
receive Western donor/NGO driven projects gratefully as passive recipients to participate in proscribed 
“communities, and to accept benefits in prescribed packages” [92] that often failed to fit within the 
socio-cultural traditions of these rural small-scale societies. The idea was that community conservation 
would fulfil human needs, with conservation being the means to achieving and maintaining this end 
[117]. These donor driven CBNRM programs tend to reward rural Africans for the loss of access to 
their resources, primarily in hunting blocks, by providing them with material compensation for 
foregoing traditional ties to wildlife and other resources; “communities do not have the right to use 
wildlife, only the right to benefit from the use of wildlife by others” [118] with no attempt at 
identifying ways by which communities manage communal resources (e.g., grazing, wildlife, fisheries, 
etc.). As a result, most local people still see wildlife as belonging to national government and/or local 
government, depending on the program [118]. 
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3.2. Economics of CBNRM, a Major Shortcoming 
 
Many individuals and groups (e.g., international sport hunting fraternity, Western donors) support 
the concept of sharing revenue from hunting with rural communities as a catalyst for development and 
as a means of co-opting communities into modern conservation, but have little insight into the realities 
on the ground, especially the economics of CBNRM. Unfortunately, while the total monetary sums 
may appear significant, at the household level other than in Botswana—if the money ever gets there 
(most often used for common property benefits)—the amount is insignificant (Table 3) due to: 1) the 
majority of the value added from wildlife, primarily from overseas trophy hunting is captured by 
governments (trophy, license and area fees), and mostly expatriate and/or white and black African 
(usually politically connected) safari operators not originating from the communal areas, and 2) the 
resource to human population ratio is too low. Fabricius; et al. [119] found that where resources have 
high unit value, such as mega-fauna, once the beneficiaries are relatively small (less than 100 
households) or at densities less than 20 people/km
2 [79,120], the income/household from community-
based wildlife management can be relatively high. Based upon the information in Table 3, few if any 
current communities within existing CBNRM programs meet these criteria. In fact, nowhere in 
CAMPFIRE has wildlife come to represent a viable mechanism for household accumulation, though it 
is seen as beneficial to the extent that it subsidizes local authorities (Rural District Councils/RDCs) [118].  
As noted, the distribution of profits from safari hunting also plays an important role in low 
household income levels. One of the most difficult problems in CBNRM is obtaining accurate figures 
from any private sector safari operator on the cost of doing business, net profits and distribution of 
these profits; as it is not in their interest. During the period (1995-2001) the principal author managed 
the Africa office for the sport hunting organization Safari Club International (SCI), representing about 
30–40,000 overseas trophy hunters (the buyers), professional hunters and safari operators (the sellers). 
SCI technical staff tried in vain to obtain information from safari operators on cash flow in the safari 
industry. The information in Table 4 is gleaned from a 2002 proposal to the Uganda Wildlife Authority 
(UWA) put together by the principal author, after leaving SCI, in collaboration with Franz Wengert, 
one of the most successful operators in the history of safari hunting in Tanzania. It is based upon his 
Tanzanian safari operation’s costs (government fees, professional hunter salaries/costs, dipping and 
packing, local staff salaries, marketing, running costs) and Tanzanian government fees (e.g., trophy 
fees, gun licenses, client hunting licenses, hunting block fees, work permits, company license, dipping 
and packing) and the business model of the very successful Tanzanian-based Wengert Windrose 
Safaris that he had just sold. Thus, the information contained in Table 4 is believed to be typical of a 
safari company in East and Southern Africa.  
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Table 3. Value (US$) of safari industries and economic benefits from related CBNRM 
programs by country. 
Country  Annual Value (US$)  Employment 
(1999) 
Annual 
Community 
Benefits (US$) 
Annual Community Benefits Per 
Household (US$) 
Botswana  Gross US$ 12.5–20 
million from trophy 
hunting,  
>1,000 1,696,272.00 
gross in 1999 
 
8.5%–13.6% of 
gross turnover 
Sankuyu Community: Ngamiland 
(ND) Area 34, 1996-2001: 22-50 
households: US$ 1,190–9,577 gross 
Khwai, Ngamiland Area 18, 
2000–2002: 35-50 households: US$ 
4,536–6,480 gross 
Okavango Community Trust: ND 
22 & 23, 2000-2004: 300–500 
households: US$ 800–1,333 gross 
Namibia  >US$ 42 million gross 
from trophy & biltong 
hunting, venison and live 
sales in 1999 
 
>US$ 4.7–5 million 
gross from trophy 
hunting (11%–12% of 
gross) in 1999 
2,125 directly 
employed in 
hunting 
industry 
 
900 directly 
employed in 
allied 
industries 
Mostly on private 
farms but 
increasingly on 
communal 
conservancies: 
 
Nyae Nyae: 
average US$ 
48,415/year gross  
Nyae Nyae Conservancy, 1997–
2002: 400 households: US$ 79 
gross 1998 to 2002, 196 gross in 
2003 
Torra Conservancy, 2002: 120 
households, US$ 853 gross
viii, US$ 
363 net for household & community 
projects: Trophy hunting + Lodge 
South Africa  Gross of US$ 38,395-39 
million from overseas 
trophy hunting in 1999. 
US$ 140-464 million 
gross from tourist 
hunting, taxidermy, live 
sales, biltong hunting & 
venison market 
5,000–6,000 
jobs from 
foreign 
hunting 
 
63,000 jobs 
On Game 
Farms 
Negligible, 99% 
hunting on private 
white owned 
farms 
 
Tanzania  Grosses of from US$ 
27–39 million/year 
   Selous Conservation Program, 
1990s to present: 16,500 
households: US$ 20.60 Gross, US$ 
15.84–16.13 Actual to community 
Cullman-Hurt Community 
Wildlife Project, 1990s: US$ 
14.50–120 Gross 
Zimbabwe  Gross US$ 18.6-22.3 
million, pre-2000 (land 
reform significantly 
reduced this income after 
2000) 
-  ≈US$ 1.56 
million gross. 
90% from 
hunting, 60% 
from elephant 
hunting 
7-8.4% of Gross 
Turnover 
CAMPFIRE, Average 1989–1999: 
≈95,000 households: US$ 18.60 
gross 
Zambia  Gross US$ 12 million in 
1999 
21 hunting 
companies 
employing 
400 people 
US$ 700,000 
gross, Gross  
5.8% of Gross 
Turnover 
ADMADE Program, 1991: 1,000 
households Munyamadzi Corridor 
only, US$ 17 gross 
LIRDP, 1990s: 10,000 Households, 
US$ 22–37 Gross 
ADMADE = Administrative Management Design for Game Management Areas & LIRDP = Luangwa Integrated 
Resource Development Project. Source: [40]. 
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Table 4. Annual income distribution from overseas sport hunting with outside safari 
company in a Ugandan management hunting block in 2002. 
COSTS AND BENEFITS  US$  % OF NET PROFITS 
(gross turnover) 
GROSS TURNOVER  818,402    
Government Portion of Trophy Fee  138,000    
Gun Licenses  6,000    
Dipping Packing and Export Fees  8,500    
Client Hunting Licenses  22,750    
Hunting Block Fees (4 Blocks)  20,000    
Professional Hunters Licenses (5)   10,000    
Work Permits (5)  2,500    
Company License  2,000    
NET INCOME TO GOVERNMENT (UWA)  209,750 
39 (25.6% of gross 
turnover) 
Remaining to Company  608,652    
RECURRING COSTS      
PH DAILY RATE US$ 150/HUNTING DAY, 360 DAYS  54,000    
CAR RATE TO PH US$ 70/HUNTING DAY, 300 DAYS  21,000    
PH TRAVEL DAY US$ 40/TRAVEL DAY  2,800    
SALARY 2 NON HUNT PROF, US$ 100/DAY  40,824    
Salary CEO  20,000    
COMPANY RUNNING COSTS (ELEC, FUEL)  100,000    
MARKETING 20,000     
Dipping Packing Fees  14,500    
Subtotal 273,124    
Net To Company  335,528    
COMMUNITY BENEFITS      
GENERAL STAFF  15,000    
OFF SEASON ANTI-POACHING (4 MOS)  15,000    
20% Of Total Trophy Fee (Govt. + Company)  47,942    
NET INCOME TO COMMUNITY   77,942  14 (9.5% of gross 
turnover, 5.9% if 
salaries discounted) 
NET PROFIT TO COMPANY   257,586  47 (gross profit 
margin 32%) 
TOTAL NET PROFIT  545,278   
Compiled in collaboration with Franz Wengert, former owner of Wengert Windrose Safaris, Tanzania, in registering 
Uganda Windrose Safaris using Tanzania costs and business model of Wengert Windrose Safaris. Source: [40] 
 
It is estimated that the percentage of net profits for a typical safari company after recurring costs 
are factored out at 47%, 39% to the government–making government both player and referee, and 14% 
for the communities, with a gross profit margin
ix to the safari company of 32% (65% of gross turnover 
if operational costs included) (Table 4) [40]. This is slightly higher than the 20-25% safari company’s 
gross profit margin suggested by Hurt and Ravn [121]. De la Harpe, et al. [122] provide a rule of 
thumb recommendation for communities/landholders to negotiate 33% of the gross turnover from 
hunting and 10% of the turnover from tourism. DeGeorges and Reilly [40] estimated that in the above 
scheme the community would receive only 9.5% of the gross turnover from hunting (Table 4). 
Similarly, it is estimated that CBNRM communities in Southern Africa capture only 5.8-13% of the 
gross turnover from safari hunting (Table 3 and Figure 4). Thus, in most cases, governments and 
private sector have become indispensable middlemen between the people and their resources. By the Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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time money filters through all the interest groups (national and local government, private sector, 
NGOs), whether its origins come directly from the resource base or indirectly from a donor, little or 
nothing reaches the people. However, there may be individual communities that do not show up in 
national analyses as presented in Table 3. Regardless, due to the low resource to household ratios, as 
currently practiced with the exception of Botswana, it is likely that few if any communities would 
significantly benefit at the household level even if the cash flow to communities from CBNRM could 
be increased 10-fold, something that is unrealistic. 
Though controversial, one has to ask if analysts such as Patel [123] are not too far off in concluding 
that many of the CBNRM and hunting programs keep rural communities marginalized while 
maintaining the old colonial ties between the safari operators and governments. As late as August 2005 
in the new South Africa, rural black communities in a presentation to the Ministry of Environment and 
Tourism had the following to say concerning the safari industry,  
 
“...this industry is an ‘old boys club’ of white men who keep the clients and their 
networks to themselves for financial gain. The standards and requirements set for one to 
become a professional hunter, which you need before being registered as an outfitter, or 
before you can become the director of a hunting academy, are stacked against black 
individuals” [124]. 
 
Figure 4. Annual gross income from safari hunting (US$ Millions) and percent gross 
turnover to community by country. Source: [40]. 
 
Herein lies another major threat for the future of safari hunting in Sub-Saharan Africa; it being 
seen as a “White Man’s Game”. For the most part, the safari operators, professional hunters, and in 
Southern Africa the game ranchers are white, as are their clients, the overseas trophy hunters. As 
noted, where black safari operators are involved (e.g., Zimbabwe and Tanzania) they tend to be 
politically connected, not from the community hunting area with little or no ability to market or run a 
safari operation. In the case of Tanzania, they tend to sublease, mostly to South Africans, who with Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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little long-term commitment have a reputation of shooting areas out of economically valuable trophy 
quality game and then moving on to the next sublease. This situation is politically untenable. While the 
Professional Hunters Association of South Africa has made a movement to get more blacks involved, 
they seem to be taking a very circuitous route by sending them to the Southern African Wildlife 
College that trains mostly government game rangers, as opposed to the direct route of professional 
hunting schools. Only the Namibia Professional Hunters Association (NAPHA), in collaboration with 
Eagle Rock Hunting School, has gone out of its way to train black professional hunters; former 
trackers and skinners on game ranches. Their next step must be to bring residents of communal 
hunting areas into the hunting fraternity. Other countries must follow suit [40]. 
Ultimately, a big difference between the wildlife “revolution” on the private ranches of Southern 
Africa and “devolution” to date in communal areas is that the landowner on a private ranch pretty 
much controls, but most importantly is the direct beneficiary of the daily rates and trophy fees from 
hunting, unless he/she chooses otherwise (sub-contract marketing to safari operator). In the communal 
areas where CBNRM is practiced, on the other hand, communities are imposed upon and dictated to 
over what resources can be harvested and required to take on all kinds of middlemen partners (e.g., 
central and local government, safari/tourism operators and NGOs) to the point that little value accrues 
to the local level. Failure to bring full devolution to producer communities is a major reason why land 
uses in many CAMPFIRE areas are incompatible with wildlife (e.g., in-migration, extension of 
cropping and increased livestock numbers) [111,125] (Figure 5). Most CBNRM programs are stuck in 
Stage 3, “Wildlife Management With the People”, and are held up in attempting to reach Stage 4, 
“Wildlife Management by the People” by a lack of trained people from the community to operate and 
manage the complex institutional arrangements, businesses and wildlife/resources at this stage and a 
reluctance by government to “let the resource go” for philosophical, political and monetary reasons [40].  
The tendency of the state preferring decentralization at the level of local government over full 
devolution to the producer communities) divorces responsibility from authority and entitlement, these 
programs remaining co-optive rather than empowering, while authority remains firmly held in state 
hands. This is institutionally fatal, since when authority and responsibility are separated, institutions 
rarely perform effectively [125,127]. Ultimately, CBNRM generally ignores opportunity costs in 
favour of a very narrow source of benefits (e.g., primarily safari hunting and some eco-tourism) that 
generally benefits the community at a higher level (e.g., social infrastructure such as roads schools, 
clinics, boreholes, grinding mills–common property benefits), but places the traditional entrepreneurs 
(e.g., hunters, charcoal makers, sawyers, fishermen, honey collectors, thatch grass collectors, wild 
medicine and food collectors, etc.) at a major disadvantage, often turning them into poachers as a 
means of supporting their households [128]. CBNRM and its revenue are “carrots” that actually 
constitute a constraint to accumulation at the level of households, since income from CBNRM at the 
household level is insignificant, while access to resources in the natural areas and expansion of 
agricultural land are forbidden because of land use planning restrictions. CBNRM disguises the real 
dilemma faced by the state, the contradictions of the dualistic nature of colonial property rights; large 
areas of privately owned white property on the best agricultural lands with large compressed black 
populations on per capita small over-crowded marginal agricultural lands, often in low rainfall areas 
[118]. Another important fact that needs to be pointed out, especially in Southern Africa that is 
undergoing land reform, is that a game ranch that supported one family, when handed over to 100s of Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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families will not create a middleclass. The same will hold for agricultural lands, especially if they are 
subdivided. 
 
Figure 5. Stages towards devolution, community-based natural resource management 
CBNRM), CAMPFIRE, Zimbabwe Source: Rigava and Chinhoyi [126]. 
 
 
 
3.3. CBNRM, Population Pressures & Land Use—Can Wildlife Compete? 
 
Meanwhile, Sub-Saharan Africa’s population has increased 5.5–6.5 times from 95.9–114 million in 
1900 to 622 million in 2000, with projections of between 1.5–1.8 billion people by the year 2050 [40]. 
At the same time, the livestock population (cattle, goats, sheep, pigs, etc.) increased from 276 to  
622 million animals between 1961 and 2003 [40] (Figure 6). The increase in human and livestock Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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populations is resulting in encroachment into parks and protected areas, major habitat loss in and 
outside (often critical rainy season dispersal areas) protected areas, desertification and ultimately the 
demise of Sub-Saharan Africa’s wildlife [40]. 
Due to the low resource to population ratio, as well as low percentage of benefits distribution, 
income alone from narrowly focused trophy hunting, as currently distributed, is unlikely to change 
attitudes towards conservation at the household level, especially among traditional resource users who 
will continue to poach. What then are potential answers? After the population issue, and education 
(e.g., taking pressure off the land by preparing youth to compete in a global society), probably the 
most important shortcoming to CBNRM is a lack of tenure, which is giving ownership back to rural 
communities of land, wildlife, timber, minerals, fisheries and other resources to be sustainably 
managed as an important component of African economies and livelihoods. 
If parks and protected areas are to have a chance of surviving the 21
st century, they will have to 
serve the interest (primarily development/economic) of the rural impoverished majority, as much if not 
more than the international elite minority, particularly growing trans-national ecotourism. However, 
land tenure without resource tenure may be of little value to rural people and may dissuade them from 
maintaining natural systems and associated biodiversity.  
Figure 6. Poverty combined with the increase in Sub-Saharan human and livestock 
populations in the 20
th century is resulting in encroachment into parks and protected areas, 
habitat loss, desertification and ultimately the demise of wildlife. Source of Photo: 
Principal author, Fulani herder, Bénoué National Park, north Cameroon, 1998. 
 
Kenya is a good example, where group ranches own the land, but not the most valuable commodity, 
wildlife, and are opting for other land uses or selling off the land to be converted into commercial and 
traditional agriculture that is in conflict with wildlife. In co-existing with wildlife without the potential 
to maximize economic and social benefits from this resource, group ranches around the Mara are 
providing hidden subsidies for conservation, including costs of lost production [40]. The average 
Maasai, seeing no value in wildlife, opted out by selling or leasing his land to commercial wheat 
schemes or small farmers. These wheat schemes increased from 404,858 ha (1 million acres) in 1981 
to 1,214,575 ha (3 million acres) by 1992 [58]. Many of these areas are critical rainy season dispersal 
areas for wildlife in the Mara. Large numbers of wildlife that disperse out of the Mara are shot as Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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problem animals. One farmer alone shot 3,000 head of game in one year [58]. Also due to the loss of 
livestock from predators, often coming out of protected areas, without appropriate compensation, and 
exclusion from lands turned into protected areas without compensation, revenge killings of lion, 
elephant and rhino over the last 30 years in and around East Africa’s protected areas have become 
fairly common as signs of protest and anger [40]. Waithaka [129] describes the following tendencies 
with regard to wildlife populations within the Mara Ecosystem that show a consistent decline: 
 
  56% overall decline in wildlife for most species in the last 20 years; 
  White-bearded Wildebeest (Connochaetes taurinus albojubatus), 81% decline, 1977–1997, 
especially in the Loita plains—the main calving and breeding grounds that have been converted 
to wheat fields; 
  Cape Buffalo (Syncerus caffer caffer) decline from 15,400 in the 1970s to 3,000 in 1994; 
  Eland (Taurotragus oryx pattersonianus) from 5,700 in the 1980s to 1,025 in 1996; 
  Kongoni/Bubal Hartebeest (Alcelaphus buselaphus cokii) from 4,150 to less than 1,400 over 
the last 20 years; 
  Topi (Damaliscus korrigum) declined from 20,748 in 1988 to 8,900 in 1996; 
  Warthog (Phacochoerus aethiopicus) decline by 88% from 1988–1996; and 
  72% decline in giraffe (Giraffa camelopardalis), common waterbuck (Kobus ellipsiprymnus) 
and other antelope from 1988–1996. 
 
This implies that wildlife must pay for its existence, both socially and economically, or risk having 
its habitat converted to wheat. This will require wildlife and its many uses to be open to a free-market, 
and/or the conservation community compensating the Maasai landowners in perpetuity for maintaining 
their ranches as extensions of the Mara ecosystem.  
 
3.4. CBNRM, Additional Shortcomings 
 
Additional shortcomings include a number of cases where CBNRM projects have become too top 
heavy and donor dependent and tend to collapse when the donors pull out [130]. Often benefit streams 
are dictated by government who most often officially “own” the resource [107,116]. There is little 
understanding by most communities of wildlife/wild Africa’s value and poor negotiating skills to 
assure a reasonable share in profits. For instance, the inequality that exists between Sub-Saharan 
Africa’s safari industry, mostly run by expatriates and/or whites, can be summed up by a comparison 
given for areas around the Selous Game Reserve (SGR), Tanzania. The average person works for TZ$ 
600/day, the equivalent of US$ 0.50–0.60/day. The average daily rate for overseas hunters is US$ 
1,500/day or the equivalent of about six years of local labor working seven days/week [131]. Jealousy 
from uneven benefit sharing between partners is a threat to sustainability in the development of East 
African community ecotourism [132]. Such inequalities make it difficult for local people to buy into 
conservation and can only be overcome with a combination of appropriate policies linked to land and 
resource tenure giving communities ownership over their resources, along with local people knowing 
the value of resources so that they can negotiate a rightful share from harvested resources. With the 
little amount of money that does get to communities, there is often a lack of transparency and Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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accountability in the use of these profits, corruption and nepotism being a danger in all Southern 
African (CBNRM) case studies [133] unless, like any business there is external auditing with the 
results being made public to the community in order to keep everyone honest [40]. This often shifts the 
locus of conflict from external to internal, with communities, previously unified in conflict against a 
common enemy in the form of the state conservation authority, are now divided internally over access 
to power and benefits [133]. Few opportunities in rural areas for higher level formal education, and the 
resulting lack of technical and managerial skills by communities contribute to this problem [97,108].  
Many of the legal institutions sanctioned and pushed by governments, Western NGOs and donors 
[e.g., trusts, communal conservancies, communal property associations (CPAs), Wildlife Management 
Areas (WMAs), Section 21 companies, etc.] under CBNRM that can enter into formal contracts with 
the private sector run contrary to the customary or informal constitutions that operate in communities 
and are in conflict with the systems of decision-making in communities that are based on negotiation 
and consensus-building [117,118], often allowing for more government and NGO control and intrusion 
over access, to management of, and the right to benefit from a community’s natural   
resources [118,134]. Today’s “chiefs” are often appointed by and/or receive a government salary, 
having more allegiance to the state than to their own people, thus facilitating outside intrusion into 
what should be local matters. Often communities are too unsophisticated due to many of the above 
constraints, as well as lacking communications to the outside world, along with knowledge of the 
marketplace. Thus, they become dependent on middlemen (e.g., safari and tourism operators to 
undertake their marketing). As concluded in Section 3.2, Table 4 these middlemen, along with 
governments take the majority of the profits [40]. Often “private sector initiatives such as direct 
payment of fees for land use, the promotion of wildlife related markets, and the development of joint 
management projects do have the potential for increasing the local value of wildlife, although they do 
not compensate for opportunity costs. However, these initiatives may simply be replacing the existing 
top-down governmental model of conservation, and unless they directly increase landowners’ control 
over the management of their own resources, local communities will remain dependent on these 
external agencies” [135]. There is a general failure to take into account cultural, ancestral and 
subsistence ties to wildlife in these protected area management plans that may be as important as 
material benefits (e.g., meat and money) in assuring the long-term success of conservation [78,92,93]. 
Ultimately, the intangible psychological liberation provided by communal ownership of land and 
resources may be as if not more important than the relatively insignificant material benefits on which 
current CBNRM programs are designed, bringing about the ultimate liberation of the African 
consciousness necessary to free itself from the shackles of colonialism that will allow South Africa’s 
past President Thabo Mbeki’s “African Renaissance” to take place [40]. Only time will tell and right 
now it is not on the side of wildlife! 
Also, as a means of assuring sustainability, there is inappropriate or no monitoring of wildlife off 
take to assure both economic and ecological sustainability. Often governments, who set the quotas, 
base them on short-term economic objectives over long-term sustainable conservation. Community 
members often lack training in appropriate monitoring of relatively easy to collect indices such as 
trophy quality, hunting effort and hunting success [40]. CBNRM is based upon the philosophical 
approach of adaptive management as developed in Southern Africa. The adaptive management 
approach relies on a crude evaluation of wildlife resources based on available data on a specific Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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species in order to make conservative estimates of sustainable off-take. This off-take is monitored 
while data gaps are identified and filled to help make better management decisions on how to best 
utilize wildlife as an economic and rural development tool for rural Africa. It is based upon a 
theoretical off-take of only 2-5% of the annual game population for trophies and another 10-25% for 
meat, depending upon the species [40]. 
Most wildlife monitoring programs in Africa have been dominated by Western researchers and 
scientists without concern for cost, being propped up by Western donors. They tend to have little or no 
training in natural resource management, and thus little or no understanding for the kind of biological 
and physical data needed to make decisions about hunting quotas and other interventions. Very often, 
expensive aerial surveys are employed with high standard errors, making the information useless for 
making management decisions. As a means of perpetuating their existence, NGOs often and 
unnecessarily make themselves indispensible middlemen, since these techniques are beyond the 
abilities of rural communities. Techniques such as aerial “distance sampling” every third year could be 
of value in open savannas, if money were available, which tends not be the case unless a donor is 
funding the effort, and then this is not sustainable since in time the donor will tire and leave. However, 
on-the-ground monitoring by professional and sport hunters, rural communities and wildlife 
department officials (e.g., game guards) is believed to be more cost effective, while providing useful 
information to make informed management decisions [40]. It is highly questionable as to whether total 
numbers are needed to establish ecologically and economically sustainable quotas for trophy   
hunting [131].  
CBNRM programs such as CAMPFIRE [136,137] and ADMADE [86] have attempted to use 
adaptive management approaches that include aerial surveys if available, observations by safari 
operators/local community members and indices such as trophy quality, hunting success and hunting 
effort (Figure 7) to establish hunting quotas.  
Marks [90,91] has used traditional hunters to collect indices of wildlife abundance in the 
Munyamadzi Corridor, Luangwa Valley, Zambia based upon effort and distance traveled from the 
village to obtain huntable game. Hulme and Taylor [138] explain that while biologists tend to stratify 
and systematically count across ecological gradients to count game, local residents go directly to the 
areas where they know the game occurs. Parker [139] is a strong proponent of using local knowledge 
to estimate wildlife status. Speaking of Jonathan Kingdon’s compilation of data on East African fauna 
using traditional hunters, among others, Parker [139] states “living among the animals, they knew 
infinitely more about local distributions than did transient white research boffins”. In 2007, Mr. Ed 
Phiri of the Zambia Wildlife Authority began a master’s degree at Tshwane University of Technology 
(TUT) in attempt to develop a national wildlife monitoring off take program for trophy hunting. 
The lack of adequate alternative livelihood options (e.g., in urban settings), as a means of taking 
pressure off the rural resource base, is another major problem [40,82,140]. In addition, hunting blocks 
and eco-tourism areas tend to exclude access to natural resources by community members [40,118]. 
Meanwhile, rural people are treated as second class citizens by the private sector operating these 
companies, employing them in low paying low self-esteem positions such as tent boys, trackers and 
skinners, who at the end of the day are sent off and isolated from clients during meals and other 
periods of socialization—“labourers and landlords”. Other than for the few who are employed in the 
safari camp, benefits from CBNRM might be considered a form of welfare where you are given money Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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for waking up in the morning, which results in passive participation and strong disincentives to work, 
since community benefits are given for being “observers on the sidelines” rather than players on the  
field [96,117]. This is less of a problem in ecotourism ventures, where black Africans are employed in 
higher paying jobs, such as tour guides, “land rover jockeys” that put them in more equitable but less 
intimate relationships with groups of clients, compared to professional hunting that often relies on 
developing close one on one ties. Hopefully, many of these shortcomings can be overcome, as 
CBNRM is a dynamic rather than static process. 
 
Figure 7. Example, triangulation of information in adaptively adjusting quotas in 
CAMPFIRE areas. Source [136]. 
 
 
 
Ultimately, for CBNRM to be successful in its dual goals of both conservation and development 
there must be significant transfers of power, and the right to directly benefit from the sustainable 
management of these resources. There will be winners (community) and losers (government, NGOs 
and private sector). Tenure also can be regarded as the extent to which an individual or community has 
rights of access to a resource and the degree of those rights [120]. Until full devolution (full 
community ownership of the land and associated resources) is the official policy, CBNRM, 
conservation and related development will deal with the symptoms rather than the causes for the 
failures to date [102]. This implies management rights, decision-making rights for the use of all Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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resource(s) on the titled land and the right to benefit from a given natural area by the community 
stakeholders/interest groups [40,102]; Stage 4 or “Wildlife Management by the People” as indicated in 
Figure 5. In fact, wildlife utilization as a long-term sustainable land use option can be considered 
unlikely unless 1) appropriate authority is devolved from the central/local government to the local 
village(s) level(s) and 2) community wildlife/other resource producers participate in the decision-
making framework, as active contributors in natural resource management [138] (e.g., becoming 
involved in wildlife monitoring, quota setting for both customary and safari hunting, anti-poaching, 
community run hunting and tourism companies, selection of joint venture partners, marketing and 
negotiating profits, etc.).  
This is as opposed to the present situation in most CBNRM programs where governments, the 
private sector and NGOs make most of the decisions concerning the management of wildlife and its 
habitat, as well as its marketing, while communities are passive participants. The lack of ownership or 
tenure over land and resources and their corresponding benefits is a major reason why so many 
development initiatives have failed over the past decades [125]. Without secure rights of access to 
natural resources, rural people will not have a long-term interest in managing them or participating in 
CBNRM. Fear not that somehow communal ownership of wildlife will result in it becoming “open 
access” and less secure. In fact, tenure rights based on membership in culturally based local groups are 
often more secure than those based on freehold tenure or leasehold introduced and backed by the  
state [125]. Communal ownership works best where traditional authority is still strong (e.g., the chief 
represents the interests of his people over that of central government, and traditional management 
systems still exist such as hunting guilds, taboos, totems, etc.), so that customary management rules 
can be fostered and built upon [108]. Ultimately, secure tenure over, or clear user rights to land and 
natural resources is of crucial importance if rural people are to manage their resources, since it 
determines the linkages between responsibility and authority over land and natural resources, and also 
determines the incentive structures for sustainable use [108]. Unless this land issue and its tenure can 
be resolved, the feasibility of CBNRM comes into question [130]. Similar to private game ranches in 
Southern Africa, the success of CBNRM initiatives may largely depend on legal ownership over 
wildlife [130], timber, mineral and other resources where community structures obtain the majority of 
the benefits from partnering with the West to use their extractive technologies, while, like any 
entrepreneur, paying taxes to the government [40]. 
 
3.5. Transfrontier Conservation Areas, CBNRM on Steroids Displacing Rural Communities 
 
A key supporter of CBNRM in the 1980s and early 1990s, USAID in southern Africa made a 
dramatic switch between 1996 and 1997 from CBNRM in favour of supporting Transboundary Natural 
Resource Management (TBNRM)/Transfrontier Conservation Areas (TFCAs) as the result of critical 
reviews over the lack of success with CBNRM and the questioned role of social sciences and 
community considerations in conservation and biodiversity. They were prepared to support “back to 
the barriers” conservation in favour of community involvement [141]. NGOs have jumped on the band 
wagon, as a means of accessing large sums of money under the globalization process where concern 
for “global commons” has become a driving force encroaching on rural people, resulting in a new form 
of imperialism [142] on a grander scale than CBNRM. The State and NGOs seek to establish TFCAs Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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for a number of political reasons; promoting regional peace, pooling resources to overcome economies 
of scale and consolidation of key ecosystems that cross political boundaries, including wildlife 
migration corridors. They are energized by “romantic ideals of recreating Eden and the Myth of Wild 
Africa” where wildlife roams free, supported by revenue from a Mecca of tourism free of immigration 
requirements. NGOs get government buy-in and then use their political influence and expertise to fund 
such programs. These NGOs hold a lot of power due to their access and control over money and their 
access to power elites within governments [143].  
As in CBNRM concern exists that few benefits will accrue to rural communities due to “the high 
amount of leakage in the tourism industry with a large percentage of earnings, wages and profits 
remitted/retained away from the area”. As in CBNRM, local communities risk to lose further through 
changing land uses, resulting in loss of access to traditional natural resources on which they depend 
economically for sustenance and for cultural purposes. Ultimately, these programs bypass working 
with communities to better manage and sustainably use their natural resources “conservation” in 
favour of strict ecological interests “preservation”, usurping community benefits and rights. In other 
words, it becomes business as usual for the Western conservation movement and Sub-Saharan African 
elite, centralizing control over land and resources, as during the colonial and postcolonial era, as 
opposed to devolution. NGOs facilitate the state in usurping traditional land and resource tenure [142] 
using the legal system and international donor support. Recent initiatives in southern Africa include: 
 
  The Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park (Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou Transfrontier Conservation 
Area (TFCA). 
  The Four Corners (Near Victoria Falls where Zimbabwe, Namibia, Zambia and Botswana 
meet). 
  ZIMOZA (Zimbabwe-Zambia-Mozambique Transboundary Area). 
 
The goal by the end of the 21
st century is for TFCAs to account for the world’s largest biodiversity 
zones [144].  
There is concern the Makuleke could lose their contractual park land–a portion of Kruger National 
Park, South Africa that they won back in the 1990s, as well as over the future of the 20,000 rural poor 
in Mozambique’s side of the Gaza-Kruger-Gonarezhou TFCA (now called Great Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park) [143]. Likely, as during colonial times, and as all too frequent in Western 
donor/NGO driven conservation in the 21
st century–this will be imposed conservation, against the will 
of local communities. The conceptualization and agreement in the creation of the Greater Limpopo 
Transfrontier Park took place without any consultation with local communities, while empowering the 
state as owner of the land and resources, not the local community-thus no real empowerment 
[143,144]. By 2003, only two workshops had been held with the elected community committee 
responsible for the five million people living in the area. Forty percent of the households in the 
Mozambican portion of the Great Limpopo Transfrontier Park never heard of the TFCA concept and of 
their involvement, resulting in an NGO/donor driven top-down process [142]. Already, the 
Mozambican government is using heavy handed repression against local hunters “poachers”, with 
plans to move the 6,000 residents outside of the park. Plans are to leave residents along the Olifants 
River alone. The north and south portions of the park will be used for tourist hunting (sport hunting) to Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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generate income for community development and to operate the park, since ecotourism is not expected 
to be significant [40]. There is concern that in the to-be-fenced (wildlife in and people out) Sengwe 
corridor of Zimbabwe, villages will be moved to make way for “Wild Africa” that tourists wish to see, 
resulting in loss of the most fertile land along rivers, pools and pans critical to both people and 
livestock, wildlife, forest products such as the liala palm used in handicrafts and community reserve 
land used for “expanding households, and strategic relocation as a result of conflict, witchcraft 
accusations, feuds, and general misunderstanding”. Relocating communities onto formerly commercial 
farms, which the bankrupt Zimbabwean government cannot support (e.g., extension and startup costs), 
will socially dislocate them from the cross border network of communities who have learned to depend 
on each other for a flow of resources and commodities necessary for survival in a subsistence 
economy. Establishment of border posts, an armed bureaucracy and formalization of mobility 
(customs) may actually impede the fluid movement of local people and resources across borders, 
central to the livelihoods in this region of southern Africa, and end up as detrimental to the 
communities [144]. In essence, TFCAs are forcing rural local people into voiceless partnerships with 
the state and NGOs backed by Western donor funding [143]. 
Along the frontiers of Southeastern Cameroon, Congo Brazzaville and the Central African 
Republic, a new form of colonization began at the end of the 20
th century in an invasion by commercial 
logging companies, Western conservation NGOs and safari operators linked to the transnational Lake 
Lobeké/Dzanga-Sangha/Nouabalé-Ndoki “Tri-National De La Sangha” National Park that crosses these 
three borders. Funded by international donors, Nelson [145] calls this vast takeover of traditional 
territories by Western conservationists, “Corporate Conservation”. Concern has even been raised that 
WCS is in collusion with a major German logging company as a means of expanding its protected area 
of Nouabalé-Ndoki, while the German logging company attempted to no avail to use WCS as a front to 
push the idea of obtaining a “green label” for sustainable logging, such as through FSC (Forest 
Stewardship Council) [146]. The project area overlaps the traditional farming, hunting and gathering 
lands, supporting thousands of Baka Pygmies and Bantu ethnic groups. There is concern that this is 
leading to the imposition of new rules affecting access to forest resources on which their livelihoods are 
based, “concordant with a systematic pattern of community neglect and marginalization observed in the 
management of other parks in Cameroon” [145]. Local communities have not been involved in 
planning for these efforts carried out by national and international elites in isolated capital cities [145]. 
The Indigenous Peoples of Africa Coordinating Committee (IPACC) at the 33rd Session of the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)/Niamey-Niger 15-29 May 2003, have raised 
concern that conservation and development programs initiated through the “Congo Basin Initiative, the 
African Partnership for Forests, the Africa Forest Law Enforcement Group and the New Partnership for 
Africa’s Development (NEPAD), are all likely to intensify this carve up of indigenous peoples’ forests 
into protected areas and logging zones without the rights of indigenous peoples being taken into 
account” [60]. 
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4. Innovative Attempts to overcome Shortcomings of CBNRM 
 
4.1. “Project Noah”, Training Rural Africans, In Wildlife Management 
 
Project Noah grew out of a scholarship initiated in 1999 to a Maasai student from Kenya sent to 
Tshwane by Tony Dyer, the doyen of professional hunters and Gilford Powys, the largest private 
landowner in Kenya, and one of the founders of the infamous Galana Ranching Scheme. Project Noah 
is an educational and training program run in collaboration with the international hunting fraternity. 
This program has as its main goal the education and training of rural youth from wildlife rich areas 
throughout Sub-Saharan Africa in the sustainable utilization and conservation of wildlife and 
associated habitats. It also exposes them to the value of wildlife and how it can serve as a powerful 
economic and rural development tool. This training takes place at the Department of Nature 
Conservation, Tshwane University of Technology (TUT), South Africa. Through the education and 
training of students and establishing them back in their countries of origin, it is believed that the 
following objectives are being achieved: 
 
  Sensitizing rural communities to the ecological and economic importance of their natural 
systems, and to develop the capacity within these communities to sustainably manage wildlife; 
  Maintaining (develop) wildlife as a viable and alternative land use option in Africa outside 
parks and protected areas; 
  Assisting in the development of grass roots democracies whereby rural communities can 
gradually take over ownership, management and the right to benefit from their wildlife and 
other natural resources; 
  Eventually influencing wildlife utilization policy (bottom up approach); 
  Creating a core of scientific expertise where students will become the future community 
wildlife managers, safari operators, government decision makers, or conservation NGO 
coordinators; 
  Ensuring that the utilization (hunting) of wildlife in Africa remains (becomes) a viable option 
of income generation, thereby ensuring that future generations of sport hunters can continue to 
practice their sport. 
 
Other objectives include: 
 
  Establishing a network whereby graduated Noah students can have access to a decision support 
system (Housed at the Department of Nature Conservation at Tshwane University Of 
Technology) whereby technical and scientific support will be rendered to former students, their 
communities and decision makers; 
  Eventually developing long-term ties with the various host countries and regional wildlife 
training institutions such as Mweka/Pasiansi and Garoua wildlife colleges, respectively in 
Tanzania and Cameroon. 
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Upon completion of their training, the idea is to plant Noah graduates back into their communities 
where they can integrate their new found knowledge into traditional management systems in finding an 
African solution to conservation that integrates rural Africans into a multiple-resource use 
conservation model, seen as an important component of the way forward [40]. To date over 50 
students from all of the major hunting countries in Africa have been provided with scholarships 
supported by the international sport hunting fraternity, including Shikar Safari Club, Dallas Safari 
Club and Safari Club International. The success of this program can be determined from the fact that 
the majority of these students have returned to their countries and/or communities and are actively 
using their new found skills and insight into the wildlife trade to further conservation and community 
development. Already, key lecturers from both Mweka and Pasiansi wildlife colleges are working on 
master and doctoral degrees, further cementing relationships between TUT and these educational 
institutions. Examples of some of the students to graduate from this program that link TUT to rural 
communities, educational institutions and game departments across the subcontinent include: 
 
Botswana 
  Tlhokomelang Ngaka, diploma in nature conservation working on a B-Tech thesis, “Can 
indigenous knowledge be incorporated into modern conservation systems”? First San woman 
to study nature conservation at a tertiary level. She is from the ancient Anikhwe or River 
Bushmen tribe, and grew up in the north-west of Botswana, in Ngamiland. 
  Matota Teko is from the Yei Tribe with a diploma in nature conservation back working in the 
Okavango Delta, Botswana. 
 
Burkina Faso 
  Yaya Ouattara, diploma in nature conservation, applying for B-tech. Chosen by the Dozo 
hunting community that is currently managing the 125,000 ha Comé-Leraba Reserve in 
Southern Burkina Faso. 
 
Cameroon 
  Heribert Ndjanga, second year nature conservation student, a young Tikar hunter from the 
village of Kong, Cameroon, where he is head of all traditional matters including access to 
wildlife and other natural resources in the surrounding forests. 
  Armand Biko’o, completed diploma, B-Tech and masters in nature conservation; thesis 
“Conservation status determination of the rare and endemic plant Haworthia koelmaniorum 
var. mcmurtryi”. Head of Cameroon Natural Resources (CAMNARES) that helps rural 
communities market their natural resources and lecturer at UNISA (University of South 
Africa), a distance education university. 
  Maliki Birosse Wardjomto completed diploma and B-Tech, near completion of master’s degree 
entitled “Fine Scale Habitat Selection of White Rhino in Songinvelo”. Comes from the vicinity 
of Bénoué, Boubandjida and Faro national parks, northern Cameroon. Interested in the plight of 
the black rhino and wild dog/lycaon in this region. Active member CAMNARES. 
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Kenya 
  Joel Ole Nyika, Maasai with diploma in nature conservation, masters degree from an English 
university, currently working in community development. 
 
Namibia 
  Paulus Arnold, diploma in nature conservation, Bushmen/San working in Tshumkwe West 
Bushmanland, Namibia as assistant landuse planner and nature conservationist. 
 
Tanzania 
  Edward Lengai Mbarnoti, diploma in nature conservation, working on a B-Tech. Works with 
Maasai pastoralist groups. Has served as a research assistant to Dr. James Ingoe from 
Department of Anthropology, University of Colorado at Denver assessing the progress of 
WMA’s (Wildlife Management Areas) around Tarangire National Park, Southern Maasailand. 
  Billy Munisi, graduated with diploma in nature conservation. Research technician at College of 
African Wildlife Management, Mweka where he has assisted many international researchers 
from America and Europe. His passion is ornithology. 
  Gladys Joseph Lendii, Maasai, diploma in nature conservation working with Maasai as a field 
officer in community development.  
  Benson Obdiel Kibonde, B-Tech in nature conservation and nearing completion of master’s 
thesis entitled “Poaching and Extent of Human-Wildlife Conflicts in and around Wildlife Areas 
in Tanzania: Case study of Selous Game Reserve and its Buffer Zone.” Longest reigning Chief 
Warden of the Selous Game Reserve and currently head Pasiansi Wildlife College, Tanzania. 
  Ladislaus Kahana, working on doctorate “The Ecology of Glade Edges: The Case of Mount 
Meru Game Reserve” Lecturer, College of African Wildlife Management, Mweka, Tanzania. 
  Honori Thomas Maliti, completed master’s thesis, “The use of GIS as a tool in wildlife 
monitoring in Tanzania: A case study on the impact of human activity on wildlife in the 
Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem”. Researcher, Tanzania Wildlife Research Institute (TAWIRI). 
  John Kaaya, working on master’s thesis, “Developing cost effectiveness in monitoring strategy 
for wildlife populations in Tanzania”. Formerly with TAWIRI, currently headquarters, Ivory 
Room, Wildlife Division, Tanzania.  
 
Zambia 
  Andrew Chomba, finished his B-Tech on the spatial distribution of black rhino in North 
Luangwa National Park, Zambia, where he is chief game ranger, as well as responsible for 
surrounding hunting blocks. His masters will be a continuation of his B-Tech, “Availability and 
Usage of Black Rhino Habitat in the North Luangwa National Park”.  
  Andrew Nkole, B-Tech Thesis: “An assessment and comparison of perceptions in 
conservation in three chiefdoms – Zambia”. Area Warden, Chunga/Kafue National Park for 
the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA). He worked under the well known ecologist Richard 
Bell who pioneered one of the early community programs linked to trophy hunting.  Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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  Edward Phiri, B-Tech and now working on Master’s degree entitled: “Institutionalizing quota 
setting through monitoring safari hunting in Zambia”. Currently, park ranger, Directorate of 
Conservation and Management, Mosi oa Tunya Area Management Unit Livingston, Zambia. 
  Macamwala Zeko Simwanza, B-Tech in nature conservation working on Master’s degree 
entitled: “Accountability and governance of community resource boards in Zambia’s Game 
Management Areas (GMAs)”. Responsible for natural resource protection and community 
awareness in the Zambia Wildlife Authority (ZAWA).  
 
Zimbabwe 
  Joseph Mundawu, diploma graduate and second year B-Tech in nature conservation. A former 
school teacher, handpicked by CAMPFIRE Association. Joseph was managing director of 
Ngala Safaris, Chirdedzi, Zimbabwe, but fled Zimbabwe, as a result of the economic collapse 
under the Mugabe regime. He hopes by the time his B-Tech is over, things will have changed 
and he can return to pursing his life’s dream of owning a safari company linked to rural 
communities.  
  Simon Steyn, diploma in nature conservation and working on B-tech thesis: “Assessment of 
community perceptions over land invasions in Gonarezhou National Park, Zimbabwe”. From 
the Chiredzi region of Southeastern Zimbabwe. A former school teacher, handpicked by the 
CAMPFIRE Association.  
 
4.2. Finding African Solutions to African Problems 
Two of the more interesting follow-up but nascent community development and conservation 
programs that TUT’s department of nature conservation is involved in include Cameroon and Burkina 
Faso, linked to chasse libre or self-guided hunting, whereby an overseas sport hunter is guided by a 
traditional hunter from the local community. This form of hunting is possible, mainly in Francophone 
countries, where highly skilled traditional hunters can act as hunting guides without having to procure 
a formal professional hunters license. There is no reason why this practice should not be expanded to 
East and Southern Africa, other than legal constraints would have to be overcome, something that may 
not be in the interest of the entrenched governments or the professional hunting fraternity. Chasse libre 
requires minimal investment by the community, since the sport hunter covers all costs from food to 
vehicle rental. The sport hunter comes self-sufficient, including camping gear. As communities build 
up infrastructure and services, they can slowly increase their fees (e.g., vehicle rental). Spending a day 
before and after the hunt in the village, guided by traditional hunters and getting to know them around 
the campfire, the visiting sport hunter and community members have as much a cultural as hunting 
experience. Most importantly, it provides local community members with the pride and dignity that 
tends to escape them in expatriate run programs, using basic counterinsurgency principles in 
conservation that provide them control over their destiny as a result of feeling ownership over and 
having the ability to control access to “their” natural area and its resources.  Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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Chasse Libre with Tikar Hunters, Cameroon 
In the case of Cameroon, students from TUT formed an NGO (non-governmental organization), 
CAMNARES (Cameroon Natural Resources). Its ultimate aim is to contribute to conservation by 
empowering local communities, overcoming poverty and creating autonomic structures for the sound 
management and sustainable use of natural resources. CAMNARES acts as an intermediary between 
sport hunter and the traditional hunters from the community. It communicates with overseas hunters 
via email, takes deposits, helps them through the airport on arrival and departure, assures that all 
trophies and skins are properly treated, stored boxed and shipped, arranges all trophy export 
documentation and acts as a buffer between the client and often stifling bureaucracy. For these 
services, it charges a fee. The first pilot program is being undertaken with the village of Kong, about 
1.5 hours north of the old German capital of Yoko. The Tikar ethnic group fled the Fulani jihad on the 
Adamawa Plateau in the 1800’s to this transitional area between the savannah and the dense humid 
lowland forests of the Congo Basin. Forgotten about by the Germans, French and Cameroon 
government until a few years ago with the declaration of the Mbam and Djerem National Park that 
they border, the village of Kong has a forest of several hundred thousand hectares that they consider 
theirs. No one goes into the forest without the permission of the chief and elders. They have a land use 
plan for the area with sections for traditional hunting and other areas they protect until a sport hunter 
arrives. Non-selective snaring is disallowed, while only selective hunting is condoned with 12 bore 
bolt action shotguns locally made from the steering wheel shafts of old Landrover vehicles. Bongos 
(Tragelaphus euryceros) are not hunted, as they are known to have great monetary value for sport 
hunting. The overseas client can also hunt the forest buffalo (Syncerus caffer nanus), western forest 
sitatunga (Tragelaphus spekei gratus), giant forest hog (Hylochoerus meinertzhageni), red river hog or 
bushpig (Potamochoerus porcus pictus), yellow-backed duiker (Cephalophus sylvicultor), and various 
other duiker species, while in the savannah area sing sing waterbuck/kob defassa (Kobus defassa 
unctuousus), kob/cob du buffon (Kobus kob kob) and warthog (Phacochoerus africanus fosser) are 
also hunted. The goal of CAMNARES is to work with community resource users to establish a land 
use and resource off take monitoring program, getting as much income from the areas as possible. In 
addition to wildlife, agriculture, eco- and cultural tourism, timber, fish and wild foods offer potential 
household level income generating opportunities. To date one of this program’s strengths is avoiding 
the pitfalls of becoming donor dependent. A student from Kong has received a 2008 scholarship from 
Shikar Safari Club to study nature conservation at TUT (Figure 8, student, Heribert Ndjanga 3
rd from 
viewer’s right looking at the picture). Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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Figure 8. Traditional Tikar hunters with chasse libre client empowered to take control 
over and manage their natural resources, Kong, Cameroon. Source: Principal author, 2005. 
 
Shortcomings unique to this program include: 1) the need to become an officially recognized 
Village Hunting Area, 2) the need for retention of all trophy fees by the community to assure an 
adequate share in the revenue stream that is currently taken by the government (Table 5); 16 as 
opposed to 28% of the gross turnover if the trophy fee is retained, falling close to the recommended 
community 33% capture of gross turnover [123], 3) the need for a detailed resource and land use plan, 
4) need for monitoring of resource harvests to assure sustainability, 5) the need for more youth trained 
at university level in nature conservation, 6) assuring a democratic structure within the community to 
determine employment in nature conservation, and to determine 7) how communal income from 
resources should be distributed.  
The relationship between CAMNARES and the community is developing into a true partnership. 
The community is taking an active role in both guiding the tourists, developing a multiple-resource use 
management plan and undertaking anti-poaching of “their” area, many of the reasons being related to 
the intangible aspects of conservation as mentioned above that impact on the psychological wellbeing 
of both the community and individuals within. There are plans to open a furniture factory to employ 
community members in the transformation of forest products from the area. 
Chasse Libre with Dozo Hunters, Burkina Faso 
The 125,000 ha Comoé-Leraba Reserve is located in Burkina Faso, on the border with the Ivory 
Coast, 530 km southwest of the capital, Ouagadougou. Since 2003, traditional Dozo hunters have been 
undertaking anti-poaching and guiding overseas sport hunters. The Dozo hunter/warriors are also the 
standing army for Conté in Guinea, rebels in the Northern Ivory Coast, and manage the peripheral 
zones in the new Park of Upper Guinea (Figure 9). Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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Figure 9. Dozo hunter warriors empowered to conduct anti-poaching and guide overseas 
trophy hunters. Source: Principal author, Folonzo, Burkina Faso, 2003. 
 
 
Table 5. Income distribution per hunt from self-guided community hunting in West Africa per hunt. 
 
CAMNARES PILOT ONE 
HUNTER + CAMERMAN 
BURKINA FASO CHASSE 
LIBRE PROGRAM, 2002 
COST 
Bongo hunt 
(Euro) 
Percent gross 
turnover 
14 Day 
buffalo hunt 
(Euro) 
Percent gross 
turnover 
 
HUNTING LICENSE  769   185   
TEMPORARY RIFLE IMPORT PERMIT   451   185   
CERTIFICATE D'ORIGINE  69   6   
VETERINARY CERTIFICATE  46  ?   
BLOCK RENTAL (Government Daily Rate)  923      
DAILY RATE (Community Fee)  1,185   862   
TROPHY FEE BONGO  1,539  -   
TROPHY FEE BUFFALO—ASSUME 1 
BUF/PERSON/HUNT 
-   692   
TROPHY FEE ROAN  -   462   
GOVERNMENT ECO-GUARDS  923   -   
GOVERNMENT FEES CAMERAMAN  1,539     
BENEFITS TO GOVERNMENT (without/with trophy 
fee) 
4,720/6,259 37/49  376  7 
COMMON PROPERTY BENEFIT (2 
TROPHIES/HUNT) &/or COMMUNITY FEE 
-   2,016   
TOTAL EMPLOYMENT FOR COMMUNITY (8–14 
people/hunt) 
867   549   
TOTAL COMMUNITY BENEFITS (without/with 
trophy fee) 
2,052/3,591 16/28  2565  47 
CAMNARES FEES  2,462  19     
OTHER COSTS (vehicle, fuel, hotels, food, airfare 
ticket, tips, etc.) Lower figure occurs if airfare, hotels 
and trophy shipment excluded to make it is more 
comparable to Table 4 
1,910-2,910   2,536-4,535   
TOTAL COST OF TRIP (Minus airfare, hotels and 
trophy shipment) 
12,683   5,477   
Extracted From: [40] & raw data provided by CAMNARES Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
 
 
768
The origin of the Donso (Dozo) hunting guilds date back to the 1236 A.D. under the Malian 
Mandingo Empire of Sundiata Keita. They consider themselves professional. Their hunting garb 
consists of an earthy dyed tunic and a special wig-like headgear. The apprentice hunter “donso dewn” 
and his hunting over a 3–6 year period are controlled by the “master hunter” or “donsofa, donso-
koutigui or kalanfa”.  
The uniqueness of this program is that the government has turned over the management and 
operation of the reserve to the peripheral community, numbering 17,000 people in 17 villages. A 
community organization, AGEREF, oversees reserve management and hunting trips. In 2002 TUT 
placed one of its students with this village, for her practical year, to help them with development of a 
land use plan, wildlife monitoring and marketing. The community also selected a student from the 
community (Yaya Ouattara) who has graduated from TUT with a diploma in nature conservation, is 
back working in his community and has plans to pursue his bachelor’s degree. In addition to income 
from trophy hunting, money is generated from leasing fishing rights and honey collection. In the  
2004–2005 season, the community netted about $US 25,000 from chasse libre, and US$ 5,000 from  
10 tons of fish [40]. Unique shortcomings to this program include: 1) though capturing 47% of the 
gross turnover, income of only US$ 7–10/household/year from chasse libre, 2) government must 
legislate the trophy fee going to the community so that it becomes permanent and 3) heavy dependence 
on outside financing from the World Bank, with potential destabilization once funding ends. One 
advantage this program has over the one in Cameroon is that the community gets to keep the trophy 
fee. Although not believed to be an issue in this case, the program and its possible expansion should be 
monitored to assure a de facto army does not develop as is believed to have happened in neighbouring 
Guinea Conakry with the National Hunters Association of traditional hunters that was originally 
established to manage protected areas and control hunting [134,147], as well as the role traditional 
hunters have played in civil wars in Sierra Leone, Liberia [40,147], and the Ivory Coast [40].  
A common problem with both TUT chasse libre programs is inadequate ties to the market place. An 
option exists to undertake a joint venture for 10–15 years with a seasoned safari operator with the 
understanding that community members are taken overseas on marketing trips and receive training in 
professional hunting. However, in the short-run the community will not necessarily be financially 
better off unless they are capable of negotiating a rightful share of net profits. The risk is that the 
expatriate safari operator will take the daily rate, leaving the community with only individual 
employment, possibly the trophy and/or conservation fee, while being relegated back to second class 
citizens in the safari camp. An expatriate safari operator was brought on for the 2009 season in the 
Burkina Faso program. It is unclear where this program is heading; destined to become another top-
down expatriate-driven hunting block, or one where the traditional Dozo hunters and community 
actively participate in the management of wildlife/resources, in running the safari company, and in 
determining access to other resources in the area. Hopefully, as these communities become more 
sophisticated and offer more services (e.g., provide their own vehicle, food and camping gear); they 
can up their daily rates and salaries and start marketing to a higher paying clientele.  Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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4.3. Conservation and CBNRM on Their Own Fail 
Due to low resource/population ratios and the narrow focus on trophy hunting, CBNRM is part of 
the solution to conservation and development, but on its own will fail. Because of low 
resource/population ratios, even if expanded to a multiple resource model, on its own, it will likely not 
create a middleclass in rural Africa. About 70-75% of Sub-Saharan Africa is comprised of savannah 
biome. Its best land use is as pasture for wildlife and livestock, but while marginal, is increasingly 
being used by itinerant farmers in search of new lands as fallow periods disappear across the 
subcontinent due to soaring human populations. This is resulting in severe environmental degradation 
and a zone of conflict, often between pastoralists and farmers, from Senegal to Darfur, Sudan along the 
Sahelian/Saharan borders, and within and between countries like Rwanda/Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Sudan/Chad/Central African Republic, and Kenya/Somalia [40]. In all instances, wildlife loses. 
Both Thomson [148] and Parker [139] see a direct relationship between human population increases 
and wildlife/habitat declines. This is readily seen in Kenya, where human populations are increasing at 
3% per annum and wildlife is decreasing at 3% per annum [149]. Norton-Griffiths [149] estimates the 
total loss of large wildlife in Kenya since 1977 at 60–70%, with equal amounts being lost within and 
outside of protected areas. In next door Tanzania, wet season populations of the most numerous 
wildlife in the Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem, wildebeest (Connochaetes taurinus) concentrated 
largely in the Simanjiro plains east of the park during this period, have declined from a high of 43,539 
in 1988 to 5,257 in 2001, while cattle have increased during the same time frame from 53,828 to 
240,842. This latter figure is ten times higher than the most abundant wildlife species in 2001, the 
zebra at a wet season population of 25,280 (41,073 in 1988). Farm plots increased from 1,051 in the 
wet season of 1988 to 49,114 during the wet season of 2001 in the Tarangire-Manyara ecosystem, 
largely in the Simanjiro plains east of Tarangire National Park, impacting the migratory routes of 
wildlife, especially wildebeest [150]. This is not unique to Maasailand, but is happening across the 
subcontinent as people opt for other land uses. For instance, in 2004, there were an estimated 1,000 +/– 
300 buffalo and 22,500 +/– 2,500 cattle in the Moyowosi South hunting block of western Tanzania. 
The largest herd of buffalo observed was about 400, whereas 20 years ago herds of up to 6,000 buffalo 
were commonly observed [40].  
While many tourists with no point of reference marvel at the abundance of wildlife in East Africa, 
well known safari operators Robin Hurt and Fred Duckworth in their mid to late 60s, who grew up in 
Kenya and are still active in East Africa, estimate that wildlife populations in Kenya and Tanzania are 
25% of what they were in their youth; a 75% reduction in numbers [40]. Due to man and the increase 
in his livestock, wildlife today makes up only 10% of the large herbivore biomass in Southern   
Africa [151]. 
Sadly, unless the value of wildlife to rural communities drastically increases, agriculture may win 
out in areas where it currently has a comparative economic advantage such as the Maasai Mara 
dispersal areas in Kenya [139] and Lake Mburo National Park [70] in Uganda. Once the mean annual 
rainfall exceeds 600 millimetres in this region, wildlife will have a difficult time out-competing the 
same land converted to agriculture [152], especially high altitude grasslands such as are found in 
Tanzania (e.g., Serengeti/Maasailand) and Kenya (e.g., Mara). This transformation has already 
occurred in the high altitude grasslands of South Africa, displacing wildlife in favour of maize Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
 
 
770
production [40]. In fact, it is estimated that more than 50% of Kenya’s higher potential land (>700 mm 
annual rainfall) has already been converted to agriculture that displaces wildlife, but is inclusive of 
livestock [149].  
In addition, the authors believe a critical factor in taking pressure off the rural resource base, is for 
Sub-Saharan Africa to go through the same urbanization, industrialization and information technology 
(IT) evolution/revolution experienced by Europe and North America in the 20
th century, where, for 
instance, less than 2% of the people in America feed the majority living in urban centres. Hara [153] 
explains how IMF/World Bank structural adjustment policies (SAPs) resulted in the collapse of local 
manufacturing industries and the shrinking of the manufacturing sector, forcing people to turn back to 
living directly off of the natural resource base in Malawi, especially the fisheries. This placed undue 
pressure on the resource base and made the co-management of fisheries between government and the 
fisher community very difficult. Hara [153] explains that the success of limiting access to a resource 
will depend on the general economy acting as a sink of excess labour. As long as employment in other 
economic sectors remains low and living directly off of natural resources (e.g., soil, wildlife, fisheries, 
forest and non-forest products) remains the main source of livelihoods, as opposed to transforming 
natural resources in industry and agro-industry, attempts to assure the sustainable use of resources will 
be difficult and co-management or sustainable management through devolution of authority to rural 
communities is unlikely to be successful. Given the population explosion of the 20
th century and the 
fact that the current population is expected to more than double again by 2050, conservation, be it 
CBNRM or fortress conservation, is doomed to failure on its own unless linked to an 
urbanization/industrialization process [40].  
At the same time, it believed that rural communities must be allowed to capture more wealth from 
the truly valuable resources in “their” natural areas, sustainably managing them as “green factories” 
not just for wildlife but also for tropical hardwoods, strategic minerals, oil, fisheries, wild medicines 
and foods, etc. This also implies transformation of these resources through “decentralized 
urbanization” in order to avoid developing mega-cities [40], mainly African capitals that concentrate 
people and place unsustainable pressure on local resources, especially water.  
Currently, South Africa is the only industrialized country transforming significant numbers of 
products on the subcontinent capable of taking advantage of a gradual opening up of trade with the 
West through programs such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). Sub-Saharan 
Africa has the unique renewable and non-renewable resources desired by the West (e.g., Democratic 
Republic of Congo contains 80% of the world’s reserves of strategic mineral COLTAN 
x necessary to 
make capacitors that manage the flow of current in electronic devices from cell phones, computers and 
stereos to videocassette recorders) [40]. Some call the region of Central/Southern Africa, 
encompassing the DRC, Zambia, Zimbabwe and South Africa, the “Persian Gulf of Strategic Minerals 
of our Earth” [154]. The governments of Sub-Saharan Africa must start dictating conditions of use, 
requiring industrialization and transformation of resources on the subcontinent, as opposed to the 
current situation of exporting most natural resources in the raw. In essence, this is already happening 
to a large degree in South Africa, locally called “beneficiation”, and its expansion must continue. To 
avoid the pitfalls of globalization, much needed foreign direct investment (FDI) must provide salaries 
based upon purchasing power parity (PPP) 
xi and address environmental issues both in and outside the Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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workplace to assure sustainability so as to prevent the pollution and slums such as seen around the 
Athi River industrial area that borders Nairobi [40]. 
4.4. A Parting Shot 
 
The following are anecdotal experiences of the principal author in his 30 years of living across  
Sub-Saharan Africa. They need no discussion, but in essence epitomize the difficulties discussed 
above that rural and urban Africans face living in a survival mode, which must be overcome before the 
average African can be concerned for long-term conservation and biodiversity goals so desired by 
Western urbanized societies. 
Fouta Djallon Mountains, Guinea Conakry 
 
Due to increasing populations, decreasing agricultural production and increasing desires to enter 
into a moneyed economy, wildlife was being mined as a short-term resource. In many instances in 
these isolated mountain communities, wildlife was more valuable than agriculture faced with poor 
infrastructure, acidic, low nutrient lateritic soils and declining fallow periods. In the mid-1980s, while 
environmental advisor to the Gambia River Basin Development Organization (OMVG), the principal 
author helped well known chimpanzee researcher Janice Carter obtain a research permit to setup in the 
Fouta Djallon Mountains. The Fouta Djallon Mountains are often called the Château d’Eau or “West 
Africa’s water reservoir” since they are the primary source of water for major rivers such as the 
Gambia, Senegal and Niger. The exploding human population and resulting deforestation was resulting 
in the chimpanzee populations becoming fragmented in isolated pockets of forest surrounded by farm 
land. Ms. Carter wished to study the consequences of this phenomenon with regards to its potential to 
isolate breeding populations of chimps, associated genetic implications if this isolation resulted in 
inbreeding and ultimately the long-term viability of these populations. On an invited visit to her camp 
site to meet with local lion hunters who worked for her, the principal author spent half a day praying 
with them, cleansing his body with holy water washed into a calabash from writings on a Koranic 
board using a bird quill and black off an iron pot. As one Fulani Marabou lion hunter explained,  
“You may think it wrong of me to hunt lion for a living. You get paid every two weeks 
down in the big city in your air-conditioned office. For one lion skin, I get what I make 
out of the ground in a year (poor lateritic soils). You can put me in jail but when I get 
out, I will do it again. I have a wife and children to feed. You have one of two choices if 
you wish me to stop. You can shoot me now or find me another way of life” [155]. 
 
Bwindi “Impenetrable Forest”, Uganda 
 
Under pressure from USAID, the 331 km
2 Bwindi National Park was created in 1991 out of what 
had been sustainably managed as both a forest and gorilla reserve. With one exception, in one of the 
most densely populated areas in Africa (140–500 persons/km
2 and an average of only 0.7 ha of land 
available per person on steeped sloped terraced soils), the people respected the forest boundary. The 
1965 Parks Act prohibited people from entering the park, an exclusion zone [69]. In 1992, when the Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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principal author accompanied Dr. Fred Kayanja, Trustee of the East African Wildlife Society and Vice 
Chancellor of Mbarara University of Science and Technology, he explained to the people that they 
would be compensated for not being able to use the Park's resources, by having schools, clinics and 
roads built for them. Pit-sawing was the major source of income from the forest. A single tree is cut, a 
pit dug, and with a two-man saw–one man on the tree and one in the pit - boards are made on the spot 
and carried out on foot paths. It is labour intensive, providing important income to heads of families, 
while no logging roads are required which fragment the forest and open it to uncontrolled access. In 
fact, in the book The mountain gorilla: Ecology and behaviour by Schaller [156], it was suggested that 
with the disappearance of the forest elephant, some pit-sawing could be beneficial to the gorillas by 
opening up the forest and providing the luxuriant vegetation they needed for food. What Schaller failed 
to mention is that until the coming of the European and his 7
th century Norman concept of exclusion 
zones, people have always played a pivotal role in determining the ecology of the Impenetrable Forest 
and most other ecosystems in Sub-Saharan Africa. Now that key mega-fauna are extinct from the 
forest, a person’s role, contradictory to what most people think, becomes that much more critical if the 
gorilla and its habitat are to survive. Wild and Mutebi [157] explain,  
 “At Bwindi the activities of buffalo (now extinct) and elephant (now very few) caused 
disturbed secondary habitats which gorillas prefer. Secondary vegetation is now 
common in the forest due to timber harvesting. With better protection the forest is 
regenerating, and gorilla habitat is likely to decline. The level of plant use established at 
BINP (Bwindi National Park) is far below the impact needed to maintain secondary 
habitats at their present extent and causes less vegetation destruction than tourist trails 
cut daily for gorilla viewing”.  
 
Most importantly, as one pit sawyer explained to Dr. Kayanja’s evaluation team,  
“Your schools, clinics and roads are well and good, but they don't fill empty bellies or 
pay school fees. We want access to the forest” [69].  
 
Wild and Mutebi [157] site similar reactions from local communities. To date it appears that about 
20% of the park has been opened to the collection of minor forest products [157,158], but not to labour 
intensive pit sawing. At the same time 
“Under pressure from traditional Western conservationists, who had come to believe 
that wilderness and human community were incompatible, the Batwa (Pygmies) were 
forcibly expelled from their homeland” [62].  
 
Munyamadzi Corridor, Zambia 
 
While the principal author was visiting the Munyamadzi GMA (Game Management Area) during an 
evaluation of ADMADE for the Zambian government and USAID in July/August 1992, four poachers 
were brought into the camp by the village scouts (Figure 10).  
The ringleader was an old man in his 60s. His history might be considered as typical of many 
“poachers” who today transition back and forth between urban and rural areas. He started his life as a Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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miner in the Copper Belt of Zambia. He claimed that as a miner he often “dreamed” of hunting, which 
might be interpreted as a dream summons from his ancestors as explained in Marks [15,89]. He was 
involved in a mining accident and returned to his home in the vicinity of Mpika in order to rehabilitate. 
While there, an elephant got into a field and his uncle gave him a muzzleloader with which he killed the 
elephant. He reported this incident to the chief and was given the meat. After a month of recuperation, he 
returned to the mines. This was 1965.  
In 1972, he stopped working in the mines after a number of near fatal accidents that caused him to fear 
for his life. He began hunting for the pot after that. He met a businessman near Ndola who had an elephant 
license and who hired him to go into the Machiya Fungulwe GMA to shoot his elephant. He did this twice, 
finding out how lucrative elephant hunting can be. He began purchasing his own elephant licenses from 
Lusaka and shooting elephant in order to sell the meat in Lusaka. He did this three times. Then in, 1974, he 
joined a “Senegalese poaching ring” that smuggled ivory. He worked with them through 1986 when the 
Senegalese were thrown out of the country. He had been caught several times in the Munyamadzi GMA, 
as recently as January 1992. He claimed that if he was not in the bush for two to three months, his body 
stiffened and that he got the urge to hunt. If he could get a job like going with the scouts, it would make 
him happy and keep him busy. He explained that if put in jail for two years, he would likely return to 
poaching on his release. Three young boys apprenticing under him were urban poor: 
  The 17 year-old said he didn't know what he was getting into and that he only went along because 
he had been told to do so; 
  The 19 year-old had been poaching with the old man since 1987; and 
  The 23 year-old had been poaching with the old man since 1991. 
Figure 10. Poachers, elephant hunter and young apprentices, apprehended by ADMADE 
game guards, Munyamadzi Corridor, Luangwa Valley ZAMBIA, 1992. Source:   
Principal author. 
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This is the first time any of these young men had been caught for poaching. The game scouts, who were 
interviewed throughout the evaluation, agreed that prison was not the solution. Similar to the lion hunters 
in Guinea, the game scouts said, “We have one of two choices, either shoot them or help them find viable 
long-term employment” [40].  
5. Conclusions 
Sub-Saharan Africa is potentially the only continent where man and mega-fauna co-evolved, both 
playing an important role in ecosystem management. Colonialism changed this relationship, 
disenfranchising rural Africans from their natural resources. Hunters and other resource users were 
turned into poachers, resulting in impoverishment, increasing malnourishment and an alienation from 
Western philosophies of conservation. This process continues, previously in the name of conservation 
and today “biodiversity” and ecotourism. Beginning in the late 1970s, community based natural 
resource management programs (CBNRM) evolved in Southern Africa in an attempt to provide 
benefits to rural Africans as a means of winning them over to this modern conservation approach. 
These programs tend to be donor/NGO driven and narrowly focused on safari hunting, ignoring the 
multitude of resources within these natural areas. Benefits tend towards common property, being 
insignificant in most cases at the household. Old colonial ties are maintained between black 
government elites and a predominantly white safari/tourism controlled industry who between them 
abscond the majority of profits. Rural Africans, who will determine the future of wildlife and their 
natural systems, must have a more active stake in the “wildlife game”, both economically and 
psychologically. Land and resource tenure are at the heart of the matter.  
As farmers are subsidized in America for setting land aside as wetlands, is it possible that 
subsidized payment of “opportunity costs” by the global community directly to communities will be 
required to offset the conversion of these areas to other land uses (e.g., maintaining threatened 
dispersal areas to parks in the Maasai ecosystem of Kenya/Tanzania, maintaining dense humid lowland 
forests in the Congo Basin for both biodiversity and as a carbon sink to absorb CO2 produced by the 
industrialized world)? In the long run, as the subcontinent develops, intangible benefits (cultural and 
ancestral ties, feeling of ownership over land and resources, and control over destinies), as in North 
America and Europe, may be the most important determinants in the future of wildlife and its habitat 
compared to the Western biased “meat and money” on which CBNRM is based; key factors often 
ignored by African governments, Western donors and NGOs. This assumes land and resource 
ownership are returned to rural communities. Regardless, due to the low resource to human population 
ratio in rural Africa, helping communities capture more of the income from trophy hunting, expanding 
multiple resource use benefits to the community, increasing household wealth and/or using community 
income to send youth off for tertiary education, as a means of competing in a global world, could be 
key catalysts to improving CBNRM. However, on their own these actions will fail unless linked to a 
decentralized urbanization/industrialization process, as a means of avoiding developing mega-cities 
that beneficiates these mostly rural resources in their country of origin, employs more people and 
ploughs the generated wealth back into the development of the region and country as a whole.  
In closing, the authors, one a son of Africa (Reilly) and the other whose father comes from Africa 
(DeGeorges), wish to wake up the world's conservation community to the fact that they are far from Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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saving wildlife through creating exclusion zones, disenfranchising Africans from their lands and 
resources, and in sharing with them the meagre proceeds provided from trophy hunting. Unless Africa 
is allowed to evolve beyond a welfare state  dependent upon foreign aid that in turn provides raw 
products to the economic benefit of the rest of the world while its people live in abject poverty, in 
trying to survive Africans will not have the luxury of caring for and taking stewardship over these 
unique resources. The 21st century will see the ultimate demise of the vast wide open space that to 
Westerners is "Wild Africa", but to Africans currently serves as their supermarket, hardware store, 
pharmacy and for many a key source of their livelihoods. Unless creative actions are taken, with a 
more than doubling of the population in the next 50 years, the shelves in these stores, with few 
exceptions, risk to be emptied and a treasure trove of biodiversity and unique cultures lost to 
humankind. 
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Notes 
 
i. The  maji or magic water reputed to prevent German bullets from killing, came from a shallow 
well called Kisima Mkwanga by Kingupira in the eastern Selous. The Germans applied a 
scorched earth policy—burning huts, laying waste and destroying crops. The Maji Maji fighters 
did the same against villages which did not join them [40]. 
ii.  Tsetse fly is the vector of human and bovine sleeping sickness/trypanosomiasis. Although there 
are trypanotolerant cattle such as the N’Dama in West Africa and the Nguni in Southern Africa, 
over much of Africa tsetse fly areas are dominated by wildlife over livestock. 
iii.  Traditional Arab sailing vessel common off the East Africa coast.  
iv.  Use of the name “World Conservation Union”, in conjunction with IUCN, began in 1990. From 
March 2008 this name is no longer commonly used. Available online: 
http://www.iucn.org/about/ (Accessed July 2009). 
v.  A term coined by well known and widely travelled Zimbabwean professional hunter, Andy 
Wilkinson, who has seen this phenomenon occurring all over the wilds of rural Africa. 
vi.  “Open Access Resources” are those owned by the state, belonging to everyone but the 
responsibility of no one but the state that resulted from the imposition of centralized management 
systems with the coming of colonialism. For the most part this carried on after independence. 
The state tended/s to be incapable of controlling access by its alienated people. Africans began 
mining wildlife as a short-term resource in favour of long-term investments in other economic 
sectors over which they had control, such as farming and livestock. This is as opposed to 
traditional “Common Property Resources”, belonging to and managed by the community as 
opposed to the individual or state. Sustainability 2009, 1                                    
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vii.  Washington Consensus policies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank 
that markets by themselves will lead to efficient outcomes driven by a profit motive, based on 
free-market fundamentalism laissez-faire policies. This included conditionalities imposed on 
developing countries to obtain loans, such as cutbacks in government expenditures, especially in 
social spending (e.g., education and health); rollback or containment of wages, privatization of 
state enterprises and deregulation of the economy, elimination or reduction of protection for the 
domestic market and less restrictions on the operations of foreign investors, successive 
devaluations of the local currency in the name of achieving export competitiveness, increased 
interest rates, and elimination of food and agricultural subsidies. The underlying intention was to 
minimize the role of the state. The folly of SAPs was brought out in the April 2009 G20 and the 
Summit of the Americas meetings, forcing the IMF to state that it will change how it relates to 
the developing world.  
viii. Note: Gross indicates total benefits divided among households. Often benefits never reach 
household, used for common property benefits and/or to run community organization (e.g., 
conservancy, trust, Section 21 company, association, etc.). Nett is what is left over for payment 
to the community for both household and/or common property benefits. 
ix.   (Net Profit To Company/Gross Profit) × 100 
x. Columbite-Tantalite. 
xi.  Income in local currency is converted to U.S. dollars, and official exchange rate adjusted for 
cost-of-living differences between the U.S. and country in question, allowing comparison of 
incomes across countries. 
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